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We survey the Personnel Economics literature, focusing on how firms establish, maintain, and end
employment relationships and on how firms provide incentives to employees. This literature has been
very successful in generating models and empirical work about incentive systems. Some of the unanswered
questions in this area -- for example, the empirical relevance of the risk/incentive tradeoff and the
question of whether CEO pay arrangements reflect competitive markets and efficient contracting --
are likely to be very difficult to answer due to measurement problems. The literature has been less
successful at explaining how firms can find the right employees in the first place. Economists understand
the broad economic forces -- matching with costly search and bilateral asymmetric information -- that
firms face in trying to hire. But the main models in this area treat firms as simple black-box production
functions. Less work has been done to understand how different firms approach the hiring problem,
what determines the firm-level heterogeneity in hiring strategies, and whether these patterns conform
to theory. We survey some literature in this area and suggest areas for further research.
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Personnel Economics is the study of the employment relationship. It is unlike most other ﬁelds
of labor economics for two reasons. First, Personnel Economics has grown up largely within
leading business schools, not economics departments. This has given the ﬁeld a more normative
orientation than what is typically found in economics. Because many researchers in this ﬁeld
must take their insights into MBA classrooms and oﬀer advice to future managers, Person-
nel Economists are typically interested in how ﬁrms can solve human resource management
problems and how the solutions to HR problems are related to ﬁrms’ broader strategic con-
texts. Second, Personnel Economics is notable in that it is shared between the ﬁelds of Labor
Economics and Organizational Economics. Because of this, Personnel Economists typically do
not treat a ﬁrm as a mere “black box” production function. The ﬁeld is instead interested in
understanding and explaining the wide array of human resource management choices made by
ﬁrms.
Personnel Economics has made great progress in the past few decades, especially in the area
of incentives. Personnel Economists, often applying key insights from advances in information
economics, have developed theoretical models that capture both the broad issues and many
of the details facing ﬁrms as they set up incentive systems. Rigorous and clever empirical
work has conﬁrmed the relevance of these models and, in some cases, found some potential
holes as well. We highlight the success of both empirical and theoretical studies of incentives
relative to the literature on hiring. As the labor market continues to get more skilled and
employer human resource strategies continue to get more sophisticated, the opportunities to
create economic surplus through eﬃcient matching of employees and ﬁrms have likely grown
and probably will continue to grow. We argue that hiring models developed to date are too far
removed from the strategic issues ﬁrms face and the empirical work is simply too limited. The
relative weakness of the hiring literature is a function of several things, including idiosyncracies
in how ﬁrms approach the issues and data limitations. But we are hopeful that new data and
new approaches will make research advances possible in this area and we suggest some avenues
for future research.
More speciﬁcally, we believe that, in developing the literature on incentives in ﬁrms, economists
have got it right (mostly). Agency-theoretic models — which explain the risk/incentive trade-
2oﬀ, multitasking, gaming, subjective performance evaluation, career concerns, tournaments,
and the like — are probably right (again, mostly). Empirical work has either conﬁrmed the
relevance of these theories or researchers have reached a point where limits on measurement
preclude sharp tests of the theory. Further, this research provides a good sense for what factors
explain across-ﬁrm and within-ﬁrm variation in the use of various incentive tools. Scholars who
teach MBAs at leading (and some not-so-leading) business schools have used these ideas —
speciﬁcally ideas about ﬁrm-level factors that inﬂuence the eﬃciency of various incentive mech-
anisms — to integrate the economics of incentives into broader discussions of organizational
and product-market strategy.
While economists have a lot to say about how a ﬁrm can motivate an employee, we have
far less to say about how the ﬁrm should go about ﬁnding the right employee in the ﬁrst place.
We do think there are models that help identify the main economic problem — matching in
the presence of search costs and bilateral asymmetric information — in hiring. And there is
empirical research consistent with the hypotheses that matching, search costs, and asymmetric
information all aﬀect ﬁrms’ hiring choices, as well as scattered research on speciﬁc strategies
that ﬁrms might pursue to hire employees.1
But as business economists, our critique of this hiring literature is that for the most part the
ﬁrm is treated as a black box. What’s lacking is (a) documentation of across-ﬁrm variation in
hiring strategies, (b) linkage of this across-ﬁrm variation in strategy to ﬁrm-level characteristics,
and (c) a tie from these facts back to theory. For example, as we shall discuss, Lazear (1998)
oﬀers conditions under which hiring risky workers can be a proﬁt-maximizing strategy for
ﬁrms. But there are notably few studies that examine across-ﬁrm variation in propensity to
hire risky workers, and then whether the observed variation ﬁts with Lazear’s theory. As
another example, Montgomery (1991) suggests that ﬁrms can mitigate asymmetric information
problems by accessing workers’ social networks in making hiring decisions. But how much
across-ﬁrm variation is there in network-based hiring? And what exactly does theory lead us
to expect about this across-ﬁrm variation?
We have two primary goals in writing this survey. First, we hope to encourage personnel
economists to redirect their eﬀorts (at least partially) away from explaining ﬁrms’ choices
1We are certainly not the ﬁrst to make the point that the demand side of the labor market — and hiring, in
particular — is understudied. See Devine and Kiefer (1991), for example.
3with regard to incentive compensation and toward ﬁrms’ choices with regard to recruitment
strategies. We believe such a shift will beneﬁt organizational economics generally, but may
also have important spillover eﬀects on other ﬁelds of economics. Macroeconomists have, for
example, long focused on frictions in labor markets as an important source of business cycles
(see Oi, 1962). Second, we oﬀer a catalog of research on ﬁrm-level recruitment strategies, in
the hope that economists will work to improve this literature.
This isn’t to say that the marginal social return to research on incentives in organizations
is zero. Many unanswered questions remain in that area — especially, we think, surrounding
the use of relational incentive contracts and subjective assessments of employee performance —
and we look forward to reading that research in the future. But we believe the social return to
research on hiring is much larger, both because we know less about hiring, and because hiring
the right employee is potentially as important or more so than motivating the employee to take
the right action after the employee has been hired (at least for some ﬁrms).
We organize this survey as follows. First, we oﬀer a short review of the literature on
incentives in organizations. Our aim here is not to be exhaustive or complete (see Lazear and
Oyer, 2010 for a fuller discussion); instead, we hope to point out some successes and attribute
some of the failures to measurement problems that will be hard to solve in future research. Our
two broad conclusions here are: (a) we have good answers to many of the big questions, and
(b) some of the unanswered questions are likely to be very hard to answer well.
Then, we turn our attention to the question of how ﬁrms hire. We outline the basic models
of matching, search, and asymmetric information. We discuss the empirical evidence that
speaks to the importance of each of these factors. Then we review the somewhat scattered
literature on ﬁrms’ actual hiring practices. Speciﬁc hiring practices we discuss include hiring
risky workers, use of labor-market intermediaries, raiding other employers, hiring CEOs, use of
various screening techniques, accessing employees’ social networks, and the inﬂuence of ﬁring
costs on hiring choices. We conclude with a call for new research.
2 Incentives in Organizations
The broad economic question surrounding incentives involves distributed beneﬁts and costs
in the presence of asymmetric information. Most employees take actions that lead to direct
4beneﬁts to the ﬁrm but not to the employee; that is, employees do not directly capture the full
marginal beneﬁt of their actions. Eﬃciency requires that employees’ actions be the ones that
maximize total beneﬁt less total cost, but the distributed nature of beneﬁt and cost plus the
potential asymmetry of information regarding these beneﬁts and costs makes the problem of
motivating eﬃcient actions quite complex.
Over the past 40 years, the huge “Contract Theory” literature has developed around this
set of issues. While contract theory is far broader than the narrow study of incentives in
employment relationships, the insights developed there have been very useful in understanding
pay-for-performance relationships in employment. We review this literature while making three
main points. First, we argue that it is well established that ﬁnancial incentives do change
behavior in organizations. Second, we argue that Personnel Economists understand the broad
outlines of how incentives in organizations work. Firms provide incentives through a great
variety of means, and empirical research suggests that our models of incentive pay are (mostly)
right. Third, we argue that two of the large unanswered questions in this literature — the
risk/incentive tradeoﬀ and whether CEO pay packages are structured correctly — are unlikely
to be easily answered. We do not intend for our discussion below to be a complete survey of
the ﬁeld; see, for example, Gibbons and Roberts (2010) for a more detailed summary.
2.1 Financial incentives do change behavior
One does still hear the claim that ﬁnancial incentives do not change behavior (see, for example,
Ariely, 2008). If true, this claim would be very problematic for Personnel and Organizational
Economics. The agency-theoretic view of behavior — which is foundational to these ﬁelds — is
that an agent selects from a set of actions with the objective of maximizing his or her expected
utility. In a basic agency model, the agent bears 100% of the disutility or cost of eﬀort, but
the principal captures 100% of the beneﬁt. In the absence of some means for aligning the two
parties’ interests, the agent will not select the eﬃcient eﬀort level. A solution to this problem
is to tie the agent’s utility to the principal’s beneﬁt, usually by varying the monetary payment
made to the agent in response to variation in some measure that’s related to the principal’s
beneﬁt. By changing the mapping from actions to utility, the principal changes the set of
utility-maximizing actions, and this means that ﬁnancial incentives can change the agent’s
action. If ﬁnancial incentives do not change behavior, then economists err in writing down
5incentive constraints in principal/agent models.
This point is so fundamental to both Personnel and Organizational Economics that it bears
repeating. Empirical research shows that ﬁnancial incentives do change behavior in organi-
zations. This has been shown repeatedly by economists using controlled ﬁeld experimental
methods in real ﬁrms using real incentives. The most convincing of these studies examine sim-
ple jobs where researchers are allowed by the ﬁrm’s management to vary the ﬁrm’s incentive pay
plans using an experimental design. Simple jobs are preferred because employees’ actions can
easily be measured, and the experimental design eliminates issues surrounding the endogenous
choice of compensation plans.
Lazear (2000) studies the implementation of a pay-for-performance plan for automobile
winshield installers at Safelite Glass. He reports four main results. First, a switch from hourly
to piece rate pay led to a 44% increase in on per-worker output. Second, about half of this gain
came from an increase in individual-level productivity as a result of the stronger incentives.
The remainder is attributable to changes in the composition in the ﬁrm’s workforce after the
implementation of the pay plan. Third, it appears the ﬁrm is compensating the employees for
higher eﬀort costs as a result of the switch. Per-worker pay increased about 10% after the
implementation of the piece rate plan. Fourth, piece rates increased the across-worker variance
of output, as better workers faced a stronger incentive to diﬀerentiate from others.
Shearer (2004) examines data from a ﬁeld experiment involving tree planters in British
Columbia. In his experiment nine men were randomly selected from the ﬁrm, and then randomly
assigned to be paid using piece rates or a ﬁxed wage. Each worker was observed under piece
rates for 60 days, and also under ﬁxed wages for 60 days. Piece rates led to a 20% increase
in individual-level productivity, a ﬁgure that is on par with that observed by Lazear (2000).
Shearer goes on to estimate a structural model of the worker’s response to incentives.
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2009) study a change in managerial incentives in an English
fruit-picking operation. When managers are paid using ﬁxed wages, they tend to favor those
with whom they are “socially connected,” as measured by shared country-of-origin, shared living
quarters, or whether the manager and worker arrived at the farm at the same time. Socially
connected workers beneﬁt from managerial favoritism in the form of higher output — by 9%
— which leads to higher pay since workers are paid piece rate throughout this experiment.
However, when managerial pay is switched from a ﬁxed wage to bonuses based on the overall
6output, managers change their behavior. They instead begin favoring the most able workers
regardless of the social connections.
So, do pay-for-performance incentives work? As Besanko et al. (2009) point out, the answer
to this question likely depends on what we mean by the word “work.” Pay-for-performance
incentives surely change behavior in organizations, as the studies cited above make clear. But
this is diﬀerent from saying that pay-for-performance incentives improve organizational perfor-
mance in all contexts. Pay-for-performance appears to induce employees to take actions that
improve measured performance, but (as the multi-tasking literature discussed below empha-
sizes) there may be important-but-harder-to-measure aspects of performance that are ignored
as employees work to hit measured-performance benchmarks. The studies cited above could
omit such eﬀects, as they focus on simple-to-measure aspects of employee performance. Fur-
ther, it is easy to ﬁnd cases where pay-for-performance does not improve performance (and
see Freeman and Kleiner, 2005 for one such example in the context of shoe manufacturing).
Broadly speaking, however, the available empirical evidence suggests that pay-for-performance
incentives are associated with improvements in organizational performance; see Bloom and Van
Reenen (2010) for a thorough review of this literature.
2.2 How do ﬁrms provide incentives?
Firms provide incentives in an astonishing variety of ways. In some jobs, pay is tied to a speciﬁc
performance measure using a speciﬁc functional form. In others, supervisors make subjective
judgments about the quality of an employee’s performance. Promotions are important in other
cases, and in still other cases it is access to future labor-market opportunities that seem to drive
choices.
Important early insights were oﬀered by Holmstrom (1979). In his model, a risk-averse
agent selects a level of costly eﬀort e to maximize his expected utility. A risk-averse principal
does not observe the agent’s eﬀort choice, but does observe “output” x which is aﬀected both
by the agent’s eﬀort choice and by a random state of nature. It is important to recognize the
speciﬁc (and narrow) agency problem considered in this paper. The agent’s choice is simply
how much eﬀort to exert — not what kind of eﬀort to exert — and the marginal return to
eﬀort is known. This turns the principal’s problem into one of statistical inference. Holmstrom
shows that the optimal sharing rule —- s(x), the share of output x that the principal pays to
7the agent — is characterized by
G0(x − s(x))
U0(s(x))




Condition (1) is intuitive. The left-hand side is the ratio of the marginal utilities for the
principal (G) and agent (U). The right-hand side is a Lagrange multiplier for the agent’s
participation constraint (λ) and a multiplier for the incentive constraint (µ) times the marginal
eﬀect of eﬀort on the likelihood of obtaining that x, scaled by the likelihood of obtaining that x.
Eﬃcient risk-sharing requires the ratio of the principal and agent utilities to be equated across
all output levels. Motivating eﬀort, however, requires the agent to be paid more — yielding
lower agent marginal utility — when the output is indicative of high eﬀort. The x for which
fe/f is large are those indicative of high eﬀort, and so the agent is paid more for these states.
The optimal contract is monotone in x if f satisﬁes the monotone likelihood ratio property (that
is, fe/f increasing in x). This model also oﬀers guidance on what information (in addition to
output x) should be used in an optimal contract. Holmstrom’s Informativeness Principle states
that any information that is incrementally informative about e should be used. That is, if x is
not a suﬃcient statistic for y with respect to eﬀort e, then y is part of the second-best contract.
The Informativeness Principle suggests, for example, that relative performance evaluation can
improve contracts when two employees outputs are positively correlated.
It is diﬃcult to identify speciﬁc employment contracts that are well described by Holm-
strom’s model. The model suggests that optimal sharing rules should be quite sensitive to the
shape of the underlying probability distribution f. Monotonicity and even linearity of shar-
ing rules are common in organizations, but are predicted by this model only in very special
cases. Further, ﬁrms commonly appear to violate the Informativeness Principle by ignoring
some performance-related information in determining pay.
Models by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Baker (1992) connect agency theory more
closely to observed employment relationships. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) build on the
linear-contracting model in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) to examine “multi-task” princi-
pal/agent models. In their model, the agent privately makes a vector of eﬀort choices, where
we can interpret the elements of the vector as eﬀorts toward various tasks. The principal is
concerned not just with the overall level of eﬀort (as in Holmstrom (1979)), but also with how
the agent allocates eﬀort across the various tasks. When the components of the eﬀort vector
8are substitutes in the agent’s cost function, the principal needs to take account of how oﬀering
stronger incentives toward one task will aﬀect the agent’s choices toward other tasks. To see
how this works, consider a simple two-task version of their model in which eﬀort e toward task
i ∈ {1,2} inﬂuences output x according to
xi = ei + ˜ i,
where ˜ i is a normal, mean-zero random variable. If the agent’s pay varies with x1 and x2
according to
β1x1 + β2x2,










∂e2∂e1 < 0, higher β1 implies that the agent will exert less eﬀort toward task 2. The
principal balances concerns for overall eﬀort levels, allocation of eﬀort across tasks, and optimal
risk sharing in designing the optimal compensation contract. One important comparative static
in their model is that the strength of incentives for task 1 (β1) can be decreasing in the noise
in the measurement of task 2 (˜ 2). When there is more risk associated with rewarding task 2,
the ﬁrm optimallly shifts toward weaker pay-for-performance incentives on that task. As task 2
incentives weaken, the employee will, according to the ﬁrst order conditions above, shift eﬀort
away from task 2 and toward task 1. If the ﬁrm values task 2 suﬃciently, it may ﬁnd it optimal
to weaken incentives toward task 1. This weakens overall eﬀort incentives, but improves balance.
This notion can be applied to, for example, the question of whether to pay school teachers for
test results. “Teaching to the test” is easily measurable, but other tasks — such as fostering
student maturity and higher-order thinking skills — are not. Poor measurement of “student
maturity” means that rewarding testing will lead teachers to shift eﬀort excessively in this
direction. School administrators may, in this case, prefer not to use test scores to determine
teacher pay. This ﬁnding illustrates that the Informativeness Principle need not apply when
ﬁrms need to motivate the right kind of eﬀort rather than simply motivating the level of eﬀort.
Baker (1992) makes a similar point using a single-task model in which a risk-neutral agent
is privately informed about how a performance measure reﬂects eﬀort. In this model, the
9marginal return to agent eﬀort is constant, but the employee’s output cannot be measured
directly. Instead, the principal observes an imperfect performance measure. The marginal eﬀect
of eﬀort on the performance measure is random, and is privately observed by the employee. This
randomness in the measurement of performance means the employee sometimes exerts more
eﬀort than the ﬁrst best, and sometimes less. Convexity of the agent’s cost function means
the agent’s expected eﬀort cost is higher when the performance measure is worse. Because the
principal must compensate the agent for expected eﬀort costs, the principal ties pay less closely
to performance when performance is less well measured.
Broadly speaking, the Holmstrom (1979), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Baker (1992)
models suggest two main costs of using pay-for-performance incentives when performance mea-
surement is imperfect. First, tying pay to badly measured performance shifts risk onto agents,
and the ﬁrm must compensate agents for bearing risk. Second, tying pay to badly measured
performance can lead agents to choose the wrong actions. We discuss the empirical research
on the risk/incentive tradeoﬀ below. There is ample evidence that problems with performance
measurement can lead agents to “game” the measures by selecting ineﬃcient actions. Oyer
(1998), for example, examines the relation between ﬁrms’ ﬁscal-year ends, non-linear incentive
pay, and seasonality in revenues. He ﬁnds that ﬁscal-year ends inﬂuence business seasonality in
most manufacturing industries. Revenues are higher toward the end of a ﬁscal year and lower
at the beginning, compared to the middle. This is consistent with the notion that salespeople
facing year-end quotas work to pull sales from the beginning of ﬁscal year t to the end of ﬁscal
year t − 1. Larkin (2007) oﬀers more direct evidence on this point in his study of proprietary
sales data from a large enterprise software ﬁrm. He ﬁnds the ﬁrm’s non-linear incentive plan
induces salespeople to shift a number of deals into a single quarter and avoid making deals in
other quarters. Salespeople also use their (limited) discretion over pricing to entice customers
into buying during periods that yield greater returns to the salespeople.
Firms commonly attempt to combat the problems with “objective” performance measures
— numerical quotas and targets — with “subjective” assessments of employee performance.
Subjective measures can include things like supervisors’ assessments or 360-degree peer re-
views. Academic economists are subject to subjective performance evaluation at the tenure
decision. In most universities, tenure isn’t based on a formula combining publication counts
and citations; instead, senior faculty subjectively assess the quality of a junior professor’s work.
10Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) examine the interplay between objective and subjective as-
sessments of employee performance. An important distinction between objective and subjective
measures is that the latter are non-veriﬁable. Thus, contracts based on subjective assessments
cannot be enforced by courts, and instead must be self-enforcing. Building on a repeated-game
model of implicit contracts model by Bull (1987), Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) ﬁrst show
that bonuses based on subjective evaluations are limited due to the ﬁrm’s reneging constraint.
A ﬁrm that pays a promised bonus today maintains the employee’s trust and, as a result, is
able to make credible promises to pay bonuses based on subjective measures in the future. The
ﬁrm therefore compares the cost of paying the bonus to the value of future cooperation. Firms
that value the future more heavily than the present are better able to pay bonuses based on
subjective measures of employee performance. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) then con-
sider how the presence of an objective measure of ﬁrm performance aﬀects the subjective bonus.
They ﬁnd that objective and subjective measures are substitutes; as the objective measure of
performance becomes a better alternative for the subjective measure, the ﬁrm places less value
on its reputation for paying bonuses based on subjective measures.
We believe there is a great need for more empirical reseach on the use of implicit contracts
and subjective performance evaluation in employment relationships. Hayes and Schaefer (2000)
oﬀer evidence consistent with the use of implicit contracts and subjective performance evalua-
tion. They argue that if boards of directors base pay for CEOs partially on information that is
not publicly available, then current pay for CEOs should predict future ﬁrm performance. Fol-
lowing the reasoning in Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994), they argue that this link should
be stronger when the available objective performance measures are weaker. Their empirical
analysis is consistent with these hypotheses, but this is at best an indirect support for the
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) model.
Promotion tournaments — which can be based either on objective or subjective measures
of performance — are a common feature within many ﬁrms. Lazear and Rosen (1981) model a
ﬁrm that will promote one of two employees to a new position. Each employee takes an action
that translates into noisy output and the ﬁrm commits in advance to promote the individual
with the higher output. For an employee participating in a promotion tournament, the ﬁrst




Eﬀort increases the probability (p) of winning the promotion tournament. The employee gets
an increase in compensation of amount ∆W if she wins, so the marginal beneﬁt of eﬀort is the
marginal eﬀect of eﬀort on the probability of winning times ∆W. Employees equate this to
the marginal cost. Note that employee 1’s probability of winning depends also on employee 2’s
eﬀort choice, so equilibrium eﬀort levels e1 and e2 are where this ﬁrst-order condition holds for
both employees simultaneously. Lazear and Rosen (1981) document a number of features of
tournaments. First, appropriate choice of ∆W can lead the employees to select the ﬁrst-best
eﬀort level. Second, holding ∆W constant, more noise in performance measurement will reduce
eﬀort. This eﬀect occurs because luck, rather than skill, becomes relatively more important in
determining the tournament winner. This reduces
∂p(e1,e2)
∂e1 . Third, tournaments are a form of
relative performance evaluation, so any common shocks to employee performance are netted
out. Fourth, when more employees compete for a promotion,
∂p(e1,e2)
∂e1 falls and the ﬁrm may
need to raise the prize ∆W to compensate.
Empirical evidence suggests that promotions are an important determinant of wage changes.
In their study of 20 years of wage data from a large ﬁrm, Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994)
ﬁnd that promotions and wage growth are highly correlated. This appears, however, to operate
in a somewhat diﬀerent manner to that suggested by Lazear and Rosen (1981). Individuals who
are promoted receive small wage premiums in the year of the promotion but tend to be those
individuals who receive large wage increases even in years when they are not promoted. Further,
wage levels in this ﬁrm are not tied directly to job levels, as there is substantial variation in
wages even among individuals at the same job level. DeVaro (2006) shows that promotions
seem to be determined by relative performance for workers in a cross-section of establishments.
He also estimates a structural model of tournaments, ﬁnding support for the assertions that
employers set wage spreads to induce eﬀort and that workers are motivated by larger promotion
wage spreads.
Employees may also be motivated by the possibility of receiving outside oﬀers. Fama (1980)
introduced this notion of “career concerns??, which was then studied in detail by Holmstrom
(1982). Holmstrom develops a model of symmetric uncertainty regarding worker ability. An
12employee’s output today depends both on his ability and his hidden eﬀort. The employee’s
wage next period depends on the market’s posterior belief regarding his ability, given observed
output today. From this setting, Holmstrom derives a “rat-race” equilibrium. Employees exert
eﬀort in a futile (at least in equilibrium) attempt to boost the market’s assessments of ability.
Eﬀort incentives in the model are strongest when the market’s prior about employee ability is
more diﬀuse. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) study data on mutual fund managers, and show that
portfolio choices seem to be inﬂuenced by career concerns. They show ﬁrst that termination is
more sensitive to performance for younger managers. Younger managers appear to respond to
the market’s updating regarding ability by selecting portfolios with less unsystematic risk and
more conventional sector weights.
2.3 Some Important but Hard-to-Answer Questions
2.3.1 The Risk/Incentive Tradeoﬀ
One of the oldest theoretical predictions in the agency literature has proved to be one of
the most diﬃcult for empirical researchers. The tradeoﬀ between risk and incentives arises if
(a) employees have convex disutility for both risk and eﬀort, and (b) performance measures
are subject to random variation. In this case, the marginal beneﬁt of using incentives comes
from the fact that the employee’s eﬀort choice is closer to the ﬁrst-best when incentives are
stronger, but the marginal cost is the increase in the employee’s risk premium. Because greater
risk increases the marginal cost of incentives without aﬀecting the marginal beneﬁt, we get
a clear comparative statics prediction: greater risk should be associated with weaker pay-for-
performance incentives.
As Prendergast (1999, 2002a,b) has pointed out, however, empirical research on this topic
oﬀers weak support at best. This challenge has led many empirical researchers to look for
new evidence in support of the tradeoﬀ between risk and incentives and has also led to the
development of models that lead to the prediction that incentives and risk will be positively
related. This literature has been useful but not fully satisfying. The central problem is that
almost any moral hazard model suggests that a large number of unobservables will inﬂuence
the strength of the pay-for-performance relationship. To identify these, we examine a simple
linear-exponential-normal agency model (of the type studied by Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991
13and applied to CEOs by Schaefer, 1998). Let an agent have CARA utility with coeﬃcient ρ,
and convex disutility of eﬀort with monetary equivalent given by c
2e2, where e is a real-valued
eﬀort choice. Suppose further that eﬀort translates into value V to the principal as follows:
V = ve + ˜ ,
where v > 0 and ˜  is a mean-zero normal random variable with variance σ2. Assuming a wage
contract that is linear in V ,
Wage = α + βV,
it is easy to show that the optimal wage contract maximizes the total certainty equivalent of





















and note that β∗ — the optimal slope of the pay-performance relation — is strictly decreasing
in σ2, consistent with the prediction of a risk-incentive tradeoﬀ.
We now consider the measurement challenges in devising a test of this relation. First is the
simple problem of measuring “risk.” The σ2 parameter in the theory is the conditional variance
of the output measure V . If eﬀort e and the marginal productivity of eﬀort v could somehow
be held constant, then the conditional variance would be equal to the unconditional variance,
and a test could examine whether var(V ) aﬀects the slope of the pay-for-performance relation.
In most tests of the risk/incentives tradeoﬀ (see Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999), some measure
of the unconditional variance of a performance measure is used to assess risk. But, of course,
the marginal return to eﬀort v and the agent’s eﬀort choice e are typically not observed by the
econometrician. It remains unclear whether var(V ) truly reﬂects the conditional variance of
output.
Second note that there are three parameters besides σ2 in our expression for β∗. Incentives
are stronger when the marginal return to eﬀort is higher (higher v), when the agent is more risk
14tolerant (lower ρ), and when the agent is more responsive to strong incentives (lower c). Notably
none of these parameters are easily observable by the econometrician, and any correlation
between these unobservables and σ2 can confound tests of the risk/incentive tradeoﬀ. Suppose,
for example, that the marginal return to eﬀort tends to be high in exactly the cases where σ2
is high. Then we may observe stronger incentives in exactly the cases where risk is greatest.
Such a ﬁnding would not imply that the theory of the risk/incentive tradeoﬀ is necessarily
wrong, but instead could indicate that we are unable to make a ceteris paribus comparison.
Prendergast (2002a) argues that such a pattern might arise if ﬁrms delegate more decision-
making authority to agents — leading to a higher marginal productivity of eﬀort — in exactly
those cases where more risk is present. Following Prendergast, Adams (2005) and DeVaro and
Kurtulus (2006) attempt to control for the degree of delegation in framing a risk/incentives
test, but ﬁnd both measuring delegation and identifying exogenous variation in delegation to
be signiﬁcant challenges. Further, delegation is just one of many potential avenues that could
lead to a positive association between v and σ2.
We think it is not clear how to solve these measurement problems surrounding the risk/incentive
tradeoﬀ. An empirical design with agent ﬁxed eﬀects can likely control for variation in ρ. But
the marginal return to eﬀort v and the second-derivative of the agent’s cost function c are
presumably match speciﬁc, and this means it will be diﬃcult to control for these with agent or
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Match-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects could help, but only if we could identify sources
of exogenous variation in the within-match σ2 and be conﬁdent that this variation in risk is
not also leading to variation in the marginal productivity of eﬀort. We think this is likely to
be a very tough nut to crack and, absent some novel measurement technique that we cannot
currently envision, we do not see this as a fruitful research area.
2.3.2 The Structure of CEO Pay
Another persistent question in the broad incentives literature surrounds the structure of CEO
pay packages. US CEO paychecks have risen ten times as fast as those of average workers since
the 1970s (The Economist, 2006). Further, the tie between CEO pay and ﬁrm performance has
strengthened, as more and more of CEO pay has come in the form of equity-based instruments.
Literally hundreds of studies — in economics, ﬁnance, accounting, and management — have
studied the question of whether CEO pay packages are eﬃcient. Our fear is that despite all
15this research — some of it conducted by the authors of this survey — social scientists really
have very little conclusive evidence on whether CEO pay is structured correctly.
As with the risk/incentive tradeoﬀ, we think the problems boil down to one of measurement.
Our agency-theoretic models of pay suggest that the eﬃcient sensitivity of pay to performance
and the eﬃcient level of pay depend on many unobservables. To illustrate our concerns, we
return to the linear contracting model we developed above. To add in a discussion of the level of
pay, we assume that the agent’s reservation utility is given by u and that the ﬁrm’s reservation
proﬁt level is π. Again assuming a linear wage contract
Wage = α + βV,
we ask what this model can tell us about α and β. As above, the eﬃcient pay-for-performance









The term α — which can be interpreted as the employee’s level of pay when V = 0 — must be
large enough to satisfy the agent’s participation constraint, which is given by






ρβ∗2σ2 ≥ u. (2)
The α term must not be so large as to leave the employer worse oﬀ than its reservation proﬁt
level. This implies
(1 − β∗)E(V |e∗) − α ≥ π (3)







ρβ∗2σ2 ≥ u + π (4)
Note that if the inequality in (4) is strict, then there are rents. For CEOs in particular, matching
and speciﬁcity of human capital would seem to make it likely that rents are present. Combining
the inequalities in (2) and (3), we have







16In words, our basic contracting model suggests that the employee’s expected level of pay α +
β∗E(V |e∗) must insure participation of both parties, but beyond that the level of pay simply
splits any match surplus.2 We assuming this surplus is split according to Nash Bargaining
where the employee get share γ. Given this, the CEO’s expected level of pay is given by









This model suggests that CEO pay should depend on
1. The marginal return to managerial eﬀort v,
2. The second derivative of the manager’s cost-of-eﬀort function c,
3. The manager’s degree of risk aversion ρ,
4. The conditional variance of output σ2,
5. The manager’s reservation utility u,
6. The ﬁrm’s reservation proﬁt level π,
7. The manager’s bargaining power γ.
Not one of these seven factors can be easily measured by empirical researchers. On top of
that, several features of this market make it diﬃcult to control for these factors using manager
or ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. First, ﬁrms employ just a single CEO at a time, and CEO tenure is
typically a number of years. This means ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects are useful only to the extent that
we believe ﬁrm characteristics do not change very quickly over time. Second, managers change
jobs infrequently and not for exogenous reasons. Third, as we noted in our discussion of the
risk/incentive tradeoﬀ, factors like the marginal return to eﬀort and the shape of the manager’s
cost-of-eﬀort function are likely to be match speciﬁc, which means they cannot be conditioned
out easily.
2Note, however, that many papers on eﬃcient CEO pay contracts assume that the CEO is on his/her partic-
ipation constraint and the ﬁrm captures all the rents. See, for example, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999). Kuhnen
and Zwiebel (2009) take a diﬀerent approach, by modeling pay as being set by the CEO himself, subject to limits
on his entrenchment.
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are well explained by our basic models of contracting and labor markets. It seems that prac-
tically any broad pattern appearing in CEO pay data can be rationalized by a clever theorist
who reverse-engineers the unobservables in such a way as to ﬁt the data (see Edmans and
Gabaix, 2009). This literature has, as a result, followed a bit of a he-said, she-said spiral, with
few conclusions drawn. As examples, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) point out that CEOs
are paid for “luck,” which seems to be inconsistent with the agency-theoretic Informativeness
Principle from Holmstrom (1979). Oyer (2004) replies that if the employee’s outside option (u,
in our model above) is correlated with industry-wide share prices, then arrangements that look
like pay-for-luck can be part of an optimal employment contract. Bebchuk and Fried (2003)
are the most vocal current academic critics of CEO pay arrangements; broadly, their argument
is that the patterns in CEO pay are hard to reconcile with any model of eﬃcient contracting
or competitive labor markets. Tervio (2009), Gabaix and Landier (2008), and Gayle and Miller
(2009) reply that changes in ﬁrm scale may have aﬀected the marginal return to managerial
ability, which in turn changes the reservation utilities of all managers through labor market
competition, which leads to a system of interrelated changes in ﬁrms’ pay plans that broadly
seems to ﬁt the pattern of changes in CEO pay over the past 30 years. Hayes and Schaefer
(2009) further complicate the picture by oﬀering a model in which CEO pay signals rents in
the CEO-ﬁrm employment relationship. If ﬁrms care about short-run share prices, they may
inﬂate CEO pay (above full-information levels) in a futile (in equilibrium) attempt to boost
market value.
Having read (and written some of) this literature, we feel simply stuck. Theory suggests a
long list of unobservables that should matter for CEO pay arrangements. It is not clear how
empirical researchers can control for all of these factors well enough to draw ﬁrm conclusions
about the degree to which CEO pay arrangements are or are not in line with theory. We know
that CEO pay is not fully eﬃcient at all ﬁrms, given the problems at ﬁrms such as MCI and
Tyco. We also know that CEO pay contracts typically have features that economists predict
to be part of an optimal contract (pay-for-performance that varies with regulation, age, and
governance in the ways we might expect). But it seems unlikely that economic research will ever
tell us exactly where the typical CEO pay arrangement lies on the spectrum from completely
ineﬃcient to completely optimal.
183 Hiring
In this section, we argue that while the fundamental economic problem in hiring is well under-
stood, the methods that ﬁrms use to solve hiring problems still need a lot more research.
The fundamental economic problem in hiring is one of matching with costly search and bilat-
eral asymmetric information. Job seekers have varying levels of aptitude, skill, and motivation,
and ﬁrms have varying needs for these attributes. Economic eﬃciency requires that the labor
market identify the best matches of workers to ﬁrms. The matching problem is complicated
by the fact that ﬁrms and workers cannot costlessly observe all relevant aspects of potential
trading partners. This means search is a common feature of hiring. A further complication is
that ﬁrms and job seekers may each be able to misrepresent their quality as a trading part-
ner. Potential employees are known to polish resumes or fabricate credentials, and ﬁrms at
times may choose to downplay or conceal unpleasant aspects of the job. Labor markets are, of
course, heterogeneous, so the extent to which matching, search, and asymmetric information
are prevalent is likely to vary across labor markets.
To review this literature, we ﬁrst outline the basic structure of our models of matching,
search, and asymmetric information in labor markets. We then critique these basic models by
pointing out that ﬁrms are, for the most part, treated as a mere production functions. The
objective function given to ﬁrms in these models is to maximize the diﬀerence between an
employee’s productivity and his wage. Because ﬁrms, in these models, are completely homoge-
neous, these models are by and large not useful for understanding ﬁrm-level heterogeneity in
hiring strategies. We then discuss the literature on speciﬁc hiring practices and issues. This
literature lacks focus, to a certain degree, and so our treatment here reads a bit like a laundry
list of unconnected issues. We discuss hiring risky workers, use of labor-market intermediaries,
raiding other employers, hiring CEOs, ﬁrms’ use of various screening techniques, accessing
employees’ social networks, and the inﬂuence of ﬁring costs on hiring choices.
3.1 Black-Box Models of Hiring
As noted above, labor economists have long recognized that hiring involves matching with costly
search and bilateral asymmetric information. Jovanovich (1979b) draws out the implications
of matching for labor markets. In his model, the productivity of a given worker/ﬁrm match is
19unknown at the time of hiring. Once on the job, the worker/ﬁrm match quality becomes known
over time as the ﬁrm gains observations about worker productivity. Employment matches
persist as long as the expected surplus in the current employment relationship exceeds the
parties’ outside options. Matches that are revealed, over time, to be poor are terminated.
Good matches persist, which implies that the hazard rate of worker/ﬁrm separations decreases
with job tenure. This empirical implication is strongly borne out by the data (see Farber,
1999). The implications of job matching are, however, diﬃcult to distinguish from those of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital (Jovanovich, 1979a). Under the hypothesis of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human
capital formation, job matches become good over time as workers invest in skills that are speciﬁc
to the ﬁrm. The question of whether the decreasing hazard rate of job loss is due to matching
or ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital remains open.
A large literature examines the eﬀects of costly search on labor markets (see Mortensen
and Pissarides, 1999). In the basic search model, workers sequentially sample wages from a
known distribution. An unemployed worker’s strategy is characterized by an optimal stopping
rule. Job oﬀers that pay wages above an endogenous reservation wage are accepted, while
others are declined. The basic employee search model has been applied to study unemployment
durations, which are a function of the exogenous wage distribution and the exogenous rate at
which wage oﬀers arrive. Equilibrium search models explicitly consider search on both sides
of the labor market, and endogenize wage distributions, job oﬀer arrival rates, and ﬁrm-level
vacancy durations. Search models that explicitly model heterogeneity in worker/ﬁrm match
quality have been applied to understand both job ﬂows and unemployment, and equilibrium
wage dispersion.
The canonical Spence (1973) signaling model begins with the presumption that workers are
privately informed about their productivity, and may take costly actions that credibly convey
information about productivity. Greenwald (1986) notes that a ﬁrm’s incumbent employer is
likely to hold a signiﬁcant informational advantage (over potential rival employers) with regard
to a given employee’s productivity. If employers focus their eﬀorts on retaining those workers
they privately observe to be able, then the stream of job changes will be adversely selected.
Employers hiring from the pool of the unemployed will hire at low wages only. Asymmetric
information can therefore impede the eﬃcient matching of workers to ﬁrms.
203.2 Firm-Level Hiring Strategies
Despite the obvious success and empirical relevance of the models above, we think there is much
work yet to be done to understand ﬁrm-level hiring choices. The work to date does not provide a
good picture of where employers spend their resources and eﬀorts when hiring workers and which
hiring investments have proven most successful in various circumstances. They have also not
generated a good sense for how to advise managers on developing a comprehensive recruitment
strategy for their organizations. We review the work to date and discuss opportunities for
future research (while noting the considerable impediments to doing the research we propose.)
3.2.1 Sources of Match-Speciﬁc Productivity
Discussions of hiring often begin with a desire to hire the right worker. But what makes a worker
“right?” To put this in Jovanovic’s terms, what are the sources of match-speciﬁc productivity?
Complementarities Firm-level heterogeneity can lead to match-speciﬁcity in productivity
if there is a complementarity between ﬁrm attributes and attributes of the employee. The
assumption of such a complementarity underlies the large literature on assortive matching in
labor markets (see Rosen, 1982 and Sattinger, 1993), but most of this literature simply assumes a
complementarity between, say, ﬁrm size and employee ability, and goes on to derive implications
for equilibrium matching. But what speciﬁc attributes are complementary? And what sources
of ﬁrm-level heterogeneity give rise to these complementarities?
One answer is that employee attributes may complement certain production technologies.
Information technology, for example, may be most productively utilized by employees with
high skill levels. Such a complementarity lies at the root of the large literature on skill-biased
technical change.3 Real prices for computing power have fallen dramatically since the 1970s,
and this period has also seen dramatic changes in skill diﬀerentials in wages, as skilled workers
saw much faster wage increases than unskilled. A complementarity between skilled labor and
information technology can explain these facts, if falling IT prices caused ﬁrms to shift labor
demand toward skilled workers.
3Katz and Autor (1999) review much of the work on skill-biased technical change as part of a review of the
literature on changing wage inequality. Autor et al. (2006) update that review in light of critiques such as Card
and DiNardo (2002).
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US Annual Survey of Manufactures to examine skill upgrading in the 1980s. They show ﬁrst
that employment of production workers in US manufacturing dropped 15 percent in the 1980s,
while employment of nonproduction workers rose 3 percent. This occurred despite the fact
that relative wages for skilled labor rose over this period. The shift in employment toward
nonproduction workers was driven primarily by changes within industry rather than between
industries, and was larger in industries that made larger investments in computer technology.
Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) show that within-industry skill-upgrading (where skill is mea-
sured by educational attainment) accelerated from the 1970s to the 1980s and 1990s, and that
various measures of computer usage were higher in the industries where skill-upgrading was
highest.
Falling prices for information technology cannot, however, serve as an explanation for ﬁrm-
level match-speciﬁcity in employee productivity. Changes in relative prices hit all ﬁrms equally,
and hence in the absence of other ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors, all ﬁrms would shift their demand toward
skilled workers equally. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) argue that investments in IT
require coinvention on the part of individual ﬁrms. That is, ﬁrms cannot beneﬁt fully from
investments in IT without also reorganizing work practices and rethinking product oﬀerings,
a process that requires experimentation. Using detailed ﬁrm-level survey data, Bresnahan
et al. (2002) show that conditional on investments in computerization, ﬁrms that do workplace
reorganizations are more likely to also adopt high-investment human resource policies, such as
screening for education in hiring, training, and cross training. The authors also report evidence
of a complementarity in production between skilled labor, workplace reorganization and IT,
as there are positive interaction eﬀects in a regression of log value added on these variables.
Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) report similar ﬁndings in their study of steel-ﬁnishing
lines. Selection and training of skilled workers are complementary to adoption and installation
of IT investments. Taken together, these results suggest that worker characteristics can be part
of a constellation of complementary ﬁrm-level attributes, as suggested by Milgrom and Roberts
(1990, 1995).
Potential employees, of course, can vary on a large number of dimensions, and most of
the literature on skill-biased technical change focuses simply on a single dimension of skill as
measured by educational attainment or a production/nonproduction worker distinction. Using
22detailed ﬁrm-level data, Abowd, Haltiwanger, Lane, McKinsey and Sandusky (2007) consider
how various components of skill are related to ﬁrms’ technological inputs. As with the skill-
biased technical change literature, the authors report a strong relationship between technology
and skill. Diﬀerent dimensions of skill interact with technology in diﬀerent ways, however.
Using methods from Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999), the authors decompose worker
skill into a a time-invariant worker eﬀect (“basic ability”) and an experience eﬀect that varies
in proportion to labor-market experience. Interestingly, ﬁrms that use advanced production
technologies are more likely to use high-ability workers, but less likely to use workers with
extensive labor-market experience.
Complementarities between potential employee characteristics and ﬁrm characteristics can
extend beyond ﬁrms’ technology choices. Andersson, Freedman, Haltiwanger, Lane and Shaw
(2009) use matched employee-employer data in the software industry to study links between
product-market segment and hiring strategies. They develop a simple theoretical model in
which ﬁrms’ relative demand for successful innovation depends on characteristics of the product-
market segment. Firms operating in market segments where payoﬀ distributions are highly
variable — video games, where having a blockbuster game can be worth hundreds of millions
of dollars, are one example — will place a greater value on innovative employees. Empirical
analysis supports this assertion. Firms operating in market segments with highly variable
payoﬀs pay higher starting salaries than other ﬁrms. These ﬁrms also oﬀer greater rewards for
employee loyalty or experience.
Speciﬁc Weights on General Skills Lazear (2003) proposes a model in which all skills are
general, but ﬁrms place diﬀerent weights on various combinations of skills. As an example,
Lazear oﬀers the case of a Silicon Valley startup that does tax optimization. A managerial
employee in this ﬁrm may need to know about tax law, economics, and Java programming.
These skills are all general, in the sense that there are other ﬁrms that would value each of
these skills. But there may be no other ﬁrm that values an employee who holds all of these
skills. An accounting ﬁrm may, for example, value knowledge of tax law and economics, but
not java programming. An employee with all three skills who suﬀered job loss may, depending
on market thickness and search costs, be unable to ﬁnd another job demanding his full basket
of skills, and may therefore receive lower wages. This observation reconciles the diﬃculty one
23often has with describing skills that are truly ﬁrm-speciﬁc with the empirical facts of wage
reductions on job loss and positive tenure coeﬃcients.
While Lazear’s model focuses largely on a number of questions related to human capital
theory — such as employees’ incentives to invest in skill and who pays for such investments
— he also interprets the model as generating a match-speciﬁc productivity as in Jovanovich
(1979a,b). Suppose there are two dimensions of skills, A and B, and let potential employee i’s
endowment of skill A (B) be given by Ai (Bi). Suppose skill endowments are heterogeneous in
the population of potential workers. Let potential employers be heterogeneous in their demands
for skills, with the output generated by employee i working at ﬁrm j given by
αjAi + βjBi.
The right employee for ﬁrm j is one whose skill endowment (Ai,Bi) matches with the ﬁrm’s
skill-weights (αj,βj). A ﬁrms with a high αj and low βj (relative to the population of ﬁrms)
will hire employees with large Ai and small Bi. Such a ﬁrm would still ﬁnd skill B to be of
value, but its willingness-to-pay for this skill would be smaller than that of other ﬁrms in the
market.
Lazear does not address the question of what gives rise to ﬁrm-level heterogeneity in skill-
weights. Presumably these derive from ﬁrm-level diﬀerences in endowments of other factors of
production or product-market strategy, but connections between, say, product-market diﬀeren-
tiation and skill-weight-driven labor-market diﬀerentiation have yet to be drawn out. It may
be fruitful to connect Lazear’s skill-weights approach to the diﬀerent dimensions of worker skill
as measured by Abowd, Haltiwanger, Lane, McKinsey and Sandusky (2007). A natural story
for the lower relative demand for experienced workers by ﬁrms with large technology invest-
ments is that experienced workers have invested in speciﬁc skills that are made obsolete by the
investments in new technologies. Drawing such connections would require detailed ﬁrm- and
employee-level data on speciﬁc skills required in jobs and held by employees.
Some of the main empirical predictions of Lazear’s model — on market thickness and ﬁrm
size eﬀects in tenure coeﬃcients in wage regressions — have yet to be examined by empiricists.
Geel, Mure and Backes-Gellner (2009) use data from the German BIBB/IAB Qualiﬁcation
and Career Surveys to test some implications of the model for occupational training. They
argue ﬁrst that when the skill requirements of an occupation are more speciﬁc, ﬁrms should
24bear a higher share of training costs. Second, they argue that more speciﬁcity in occupational
skill-weights should be associated with a smaller likelihood of changing occupations. The Qual-
iﬁcation Survey studied by Geel et al. (2009) oﬀers detailed survey evidence on skills possessed
by individuals in diﬀerent occupations, which allows the authors to construct an index of oc-
cupational skill-speciﬁcity. Greater skill-speciﬁcity is associated with both a larger investment
by ﬁrms in training, and lower across-occupation mobility after skills have been acquired.
Risky Workers Lazear (1998) argues that potential employees may vary not just in their
skill — that is, the ﬁrst moment of the distribution of their productivity — but also in the
degree to which the employee is risky (that is, the second moment of the employee’s productivity
distribution). He develops an equilibrium model where potential employees vary in terms of
their riskiness, and derives predictions about which ﬁrms are good matches for risky workers. If
ﬁrms can easily terminate risky workers whose productivity is revealed to be low and earn rents
on those with high realized productivity, then hiring a risky worker has option value. Some
barriers to mobility — either from direct turnover costs or employer private information about
worker ability — must be in place in order to give risky employees option value. Given these
ingredients, risky workers will be preferred to safe workers at a given wage. In equilibrium,
wages adjust so that the marginal ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between hiring risky and safe workers.
Firms that expect to be in business for a long period of time value risky workers more, since
they will be in position to earn the full stream of possible rents. Firms facing high turnover costs
or low information barriers to raids will ﬁnd it more attractive to hire safe workers. Lazear’s
theory suggests that good matches for a given employer can depend on the second moment of
employee productivity and ﬁrm-level characteristics such as ﬁring costs, expected ﬁrm lifespan,
and the degree of private information.
Burgess, Lane and Stevens (1998) examine one prediction of this model, speciﬁcally that
ﬁrms with short expected time horizons will hire safe workers and therefore have low turnover.
The authors use establishment-level data to relate ﬁrm-level churning ﬂows — that is, changes
in a ﬁrms’ workforce that are not accounted for by growth or contraction of the ﬁrm itself — to
industry growth rate and mean ﬁrm age. Results suggest that ﬁrms in growing industries (as
measured by industry growth rate) do indeed have higher churning ﬂows. Firms in industries
with older ﬁrms have lower churning. It is not clear from the analysis whether industries with
25older ﬁrms should have longer or shorter expected future life; one can imagine that eﬀect going
in either direction.
Lazear also suggests that younger workers — who have less history in the labor market and
therefore greater uncertainty about future productivity — might have greater option value. If
so, then increases in termination costs will reduce this option value, and cause employers to
shift demand away from younger workers. This argument is developed further by Oyer and
Schaefer (2002), who extend it by connecting termination costs to data on how propensity-to-
litigate varies with age for members of protected classes. Their empirical analysis studies how
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA91) — which increased termination costs for members of
certain protected classes — aﬀected returns to experience. Unlike some prior aﬃrmative action
legislation, CRA91 had small aggregate wage and employment eﬀects. However, CRA91 does
seem to have changed the wage/experience proﬁle for members of some protected groups.
Both Burgess et al. (1998) and Oyer and Schaefer (2002) are somewhat indirect as tests of
Lazear’s hypothesis, because neither study is directly able to measure across-worker variation
in “risk”. Indeed, it is diﬃcult to imagine how one might do this in a standard employment
setting. Two papers, Hendricks, DeBrock and Koenker (2003) and Bollinger and Hotchkiss
(2003), use sports as a laboratory to examine the impact of uncertainty on hiring. These
measurement beneﬁts do come with a cost, however, since sports leagues often restrict within-
league competition for players. Bollinger and Hotchkiss (2003) study baseball, where detailed
statistics on player performance permit the explicit calculation of both the level and variability
of expected performance. They show that players who have not yet become free agents earn a
premium for riskiness — players with performance variability that is higher by one standard
deviation earn 7% more, holding all else constant. It is not clear to us what the source of this
premium is, however. In their sample, reserve clause players (those in the early years of their
career) were governed by strict monopsony rules that limited bidding for players. In Lazear’s
model it is competition that drives wages up for riskier workers, and this eﬀect is necessarily
absent for young baseball players. It is possible that their results are driven by some feature of
the salary arbitration process, rather than the eﬀects in Lazear’s model.
Hendricks, DeBrock and Koenker (2003) study the US National Football League (NFL),
which has a number of features that make is a useful setting in which to test Lazear’s model.
First, the NFL features a “draft” in which teams select, in a predetermined order, players
26who have completed their college football careers. Second, players vary in terms of the quality
of their college teams; Hendricks et al. (2003) use this variation to proxy for risk under the
hypothesis that a player from a minor college team will not have faced strong competition
during his college career, and therefore professional teams will have less information regarding
productivity. Third, players are bound to teams for a ﬁxed period of time after the draft and
players can be terminated costlessly. The authors ﬁnd that conditional on being selected in an
early round of the draft, players from less prominent colleges tend to have better careers. In
later rounds of the draft, the reverse is true, which suggests that teams might place a higher
value on uncertainty in later rounds. The authors conclude that there is support both for
Lazear’s model and for various forms of statistical discrimination.
Employee Preferences or Beliefs The right employee might also be one who has the
right beliefs or preferences. Under a standard agency model, all employers would prefer to
have employees who are tolerant of risk and eﬀort. It is also straightforward to show that
employers will beneﬁt from selecting employees who are intrinsically motivated to perform the
task required for the job. But organization theorists have recently begun to develop models in
which ﬁrms might heterogeneously demand employees with certain beliefs or preferences that
diﬀer from those of the ﬁrm’s owners.
Van den Steen (2005) starts by eliminating the common priors assumption that is standard
in much of economic theory. He considers a ﬁrm that must ﬁrst identify a project and decide
whether to invest, when the state of the world is unknown. There are two potential states of the
world, and the ﬁrm’s project will succeed only if it matches the actual state. An employee must
choose one of the potential states, and then exert costly eﬀort that increases the probability that
the employee will identify a project. Direct pay-for-performance eﬀort incentives are ruled out.
If a project is identiﬁed, then a manager sees the (random) cost of implementing the project and
decides whether to implement. If the project is implemented, then it succeeds if the employee’s
initial choice of state was correct, and fails otherwise. Both manager and employee receive a
deterministic beneﬁt for project success.
Van den Steen shows that expected proﬁts (relative to a reference belief) are higher when
the ﬁrm hires a manager who is a “visionary,” in the sense that the manager has a much stronger
prior about the true state of the world than does the ﬁrm. As an example, if a ﬁrm thinks
27the states A and B are equally likely, it can still proﬁt by hiring a manager whose prior is that
state A obtains with probability 1. There are two reasons for this. First, hiring a visionary
manager induces a beneﬁcial sorting in the labor market. Firms with visionary managers will
hire workers who agree with the manager’s vision. Second, agreement within the organization
about the correct course of action is valuable because it encourages the employee to exert high
eﬀort in searching for a project. An employee who knows his manager agrees with him about
the likely state will exert more eﬀort looking for a project, because conditional on ﬁnding a
project the likelihood of implementation is higher. Thus, the right employee for a ﬁrm to have
is one who agrees with the vision laid out by the ﬁrm’s top management.
One implication of the Van den Steen model is that turnover of manager and subordinate
should be temporally linked; a manager with a strong vision will attract a subordinate with
similar beliefs, and these subordinates will not be the eﬃcient matches for a successor manager
who holds diﬀerent beliefs. This implication is supported by the results of Hayes, Oyer and
Schaefer (2006), who study top executive teams for evidence of complementarities among co-
workers. Their main results are that the probability of non-CEO turnover increases markedly
around times of CEO turnover, and that this eﬀect depends on how long the CEO and non-
CEO managers have worked together. Their evidence, however, is consistent with any source
of complementarity among co-workers. Employees who have complementary skills, or invest in
co-worker-speciﬁc human capital, or who simply enjoy working together will exhibit a similar
pattern in turnover.
Prendergast (2007) begins from the premise that providing monetary incentives for “bu-
reaucrats” is diﬃcult. He observes that incentives for eﬀort must then be provided through
selecting the preferences of the bureaucrat, but that bureaucracies seem to diﬀer in their selec-
tion. While some bureaucrats — teachers, ﬁremen, and social workers — appear to be selected
for preferences that are biased toward their clients, others — police and tax agents — appear
to be biased against. Prendergast develops a model in which a social planner hires a bureaucrat
to generate information used to assign a treatment to a client. As in Van den Steen’s model
(where the agent’s incentives to develop a project are shaped entirely by his belief congruence
with the manager), here the bureaucrat’s eﬀort incentives are driven by his preferences regard-
ing the client. Social surplus is highest when the bureaucrat puts more eﬀort into acquiring
information, so the key eﬀect in the model is how bias inﬂuences eﬀort choice. When client and
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surgery is warranted), a bureaucrat who is altruistic — that is, biased in favor of the client —
exerts greatest eﬀort. If client and social interests are not aligned, as in the case where the
“treatment” is a prison sentence, then clients beneﬁt from a less informed bureaucrat and hence
an altruistic bureaucrat would exert too little eﬀort. In this case, a bureaucrat who is actively
hostile to the client’s interest can yield higher social surplus. Prendergast then shows that
selecting the appropriate employees into a bureaucracy is likely to be diﬃcult when potential
employee preferences are not publicly observed. One possible outcome is bifurcated selection,
where bureaucrats are either those most preferred by the principal or those least preferred by
the principal.
Prendergast (2009) develops another model in which the inability to contract on output
holds implications for the selection of workers. An institution carries out two tasks and employs
two agents to do so. Each of the two workers is primarily responsible for one of the tasks, but
contributes to the institution’s success with regard to both. An example is a university’s faculty
and its administration. The university aims to both serve students and alumni and conduct
research, and each party (faculty and administration) impact both. Incentives in the model
come both from direct monetary payments from the institution to the agents and from career
concern incentives. Notably, however, incentives from career concerns are biased toward one
of the tasks. As the institution’s ability to contract on output falls, it substitutes toward the
biased career-concern-based incentives. This yields a beneﬁt in the form of higher eﬀort, but
generates costs in that the two agents will frequently fail to cooperate.
3.2.2 Inducing Self-Selection
The problem of hiring the “right” employee is further complicated by the possibility that em-
ployees may be privately informed about relevant personal attributes. Employees may have an
incentive to misrepresent qualiﬁcations and overplay experience. Since Salop and Salop (1976),
labor economists have thought about how ﬁrms might solve informational problems by inducing
employees to reveal information prior to the hiring decision. Salop and Salop point out that
compensation policy is one tool ﬁrms can use to induce self-selection. In their model, potential
employees are privately informed about their exogenous short-run probability of quitting the
job. Firms incur training expenses, so quits are costly and ﬁrms prefer to hire only workers with
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up front, and then making a payment to the employee that is conditioned on the employee re-
maining with the ﬁrm. See, also, Lazear (1979) on the role of mandatory retirement in settings
where ﬁrms overpay relative to productivity late in an employee’s career. In general, ﬁrms will
want to oﬀer forms of compensation that are most valuable to the type of employee the ﬁrm
wishes to attract.
Inducing self-selection is one of the leading explanations for the use of performance-based
pay in organizations. As Lazear (1986, 2001) notes, employees who believe themselves to
be productive will expect to earn larger payments in a pay-for-performance scheme. It is
straightforward for ﬁrms to structure “incentive” compensation such that the participation
constraint is met for a high-ability worker, but not for a low-ability worker. Such pay plans can
be proﬁt-maximizing even if there are no hidden-action problem. In his Safelite study (discussed
earlier), Lazear (2000) shows that the implementation of a piece-rate incentive system was
associated with an increase in the quality of newly hired workers. Janssen (2002) shows how
compensation policy can be used to encourage employees to signal. He shows that ﬁrms may
want to raise wages when job openings attract an excess supply of applicants. Raising the
posted wage oﬀer increases the return associated with being hired, and thus encourages the
best of the potential applicants to engage in costly signaling.
More recent research has focused on how ﬁrms can induce self-selection on dimensions other
than simple ability. Oyer and Schaefer (2005) argue that inducing self-selection is one of the
leading potential explanations for the recent rise in stock-based pay for lower-level employees.
Because lower-level employees have little, if any, impact on a ﬁrm’s share price, a grant of stock
options to a lower-level employee cannot induce selection on ability. But if potential employees’
valuations of option grants are heterogeneous, the requirement that employees accept options as
part of pay will tend to select those individuals who value the option grant most highly. Thus,
option grants will tend to select employees who are less (a) risk averse and (b) more optimistic
regarding the ﬁrm’s prospects. Firms can beneﬁt from attracting such employees in a variety
of ways; for example, employees who are optimistic about the ﬁrm’s prospects will tend to be
those who agree with the “vision” proposed by top management (as in Van den Steen, 2005),
and hence will be more willing to make investments that are speciﬁc to that vision.
Using survey data on actual option grants made by US ﬁrms, Oyer and Schaefer (2005)
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this sorting explanation. For example, they show that a somewhat risk-averse employee who
believes the ﬁrm’s stock will appreciate by 25% annually would prefer the observed option-plus-
salary package to a cash-only compensation plan that yields the same net cost to the employer.
Magnitudes of the option grants they observe are also consistent with a retention story of stock
option use (see Oyer, 2004), but are hard to reconcile with an incentives-based explanation of
stock-option usage. Oyer and Schaefer (2006) derive conditions under which options perform
better than stock grants at inducing this selection. Bergman and Jenter (2007) note that
optimistic employees can purchase equity-based instruments on their own accounts, and derive
conditions under which the ﬁrm can extract some rents by making direct grants of options.
They show that ﬁrms extract rents if employees prefer equity that has been granted by the ﬁrm
to that sold in the market, or if the ﬁrm’s equity is overvalued in the market. Their empirical
analysis suggests that ﬁrms may use options when boundedly rational employees are excessively
optimistic about future share prices. Given the changes to the accounting treatment of stock
options (in 2005) and the stock market crash of 2008, we think it possible that ﬁrms may change
their stock-option-granting behavior going forward, and we encourage further research in that
direction.
Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) study a model in which workers are heterogeneous in their in-
trinsic motivation to work for a ﬁrm. Oﬀering higher wages increases the pool of potential
applicants, but results in lower proﬁts for the ﬁrm. When the ﬁrm can observe worker mo-
tivation, it faces a time-inconsistency problem. The ﬁrm wants to oﬀer high wages to ensure
a large pool of applicants, but then will be tempted to renege on this commitment (to grab
rents) once it identiﬁes a worker with high intrinsic motivation. A solution is to commit to a
high minimum wage ex ante. When the ﬁrm cannot observe worker motivation, paying a high
minimum wage would induce workers with low intrinsic motivation to apply. In this case, the
ﬁrm ensures a good match by oﬀering a lower wage, but this leads to a higher likelihood of
having the vacancy go unﬁlled.
3.2.3 Labor-Market Intermediaries
Autor (2009) summarizes a recent volume of collected papers on labor market intermediation,
and argues that intermediation arises primarily to solve problems of costly search, asymmetric
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recruiting on the internet, below.) We think the ﬁeld could beneﬁt from continued research in
this area, speciﬁcally in the area of how employers interface with intermediaries.
One stream of literature focuses on the role of temporary help ﬁrms as an intermediary.
Autor (2001a) notes that temp agencies often provide free training in general skills such as
computer software packages, in apparent violation of standard human capital theory. He argues
that this training both induces worker self-selection and allows these ﬁrms to privately screen
on worker ability. Temp agencies can then exploit this short-run information advantage about
unobserved worker ability to recoup the costs of training. Notably, Autor reports that ﬁrms
are increasingly using temp agencies to identify candidates for permanent employment. Thus,
a ﬁrm hiring through a temp agency essentially outsources the screening function to a specialist
intermediary. Despite this, Autor and Houseman (2005) report that low-skilled workers in
Michigan did not ﬁnd better permanent employment matches when placed initially with temp
agencies.
One intermediary about which very little is known (at least by labor economists) is the
executive search ﬁrm.4 While search ﬁrms surely account for a very small fraction of overall
hiring, they are commonly used to ﬁll important positions at the top of large organizations,
both for-proﬁt and non-proﬁt. Bull, Ornati and Tedeschi (1987) oﬀer a theoretical model
of executive search ﬁrms, in which employers must undertake costly screening to determine
whether a prospective employee is a good ﬁt. In their model, executive search ﬁrms incur the
same costs as employers when screening potential employees. Search ﬁrms have two advantages
in this model: (1) they can diversify sampling risk, and (2) they can screen potential employees
in advance, and therefore ﬁll vacancies more quickly than the employer could do on its own.
It has now been more than twenty years since the preliminary step of Bull et al. (1987), and
there has been essentially no follow-on literature in economics on executive search.5 While some
economists have succeeded in getting data from prominent search ﬁrms about their businesses,
4Kaplan et al. (2008) study a related labor market intermediary — a ﬁrm that assesses the talent of candidates
for top management positions. They show that certain skills are particularly valuable to Private Equity and
Venture Capital ﬁrms choosing managers for their portfolio companies.
5There is some discussion of search ﬁrms in Simon and Warner (1992), which we discuss below, but they treat
search ﬁrms as simply another source of employee referrals.
32there has been little progress toward understanding the economic role of the search ﬁrm itself.
Cappelli and Hamori (2006), for example, use detailed records from a search ﬁrm — includ-
ing whether target executives contacted by the search ﬁrm have declined or pursued oﬀers of
employment — to assess factors that aﬀect employee loyalty.
While it is certainly possible that search economies of the type considered by Bull et al.
(1987) are valuable, our sense is that other factors play a more important role in explaining
executive search. There are small literatures in management and sociology examining executive
search. Khurana (2002), for example, conducts a series of interviews with search ﬁrm employees,
CEOs who had been recruited by search ﬁrms, and directors who had participated in CEO
selections. He argues that the CEO labor market is characterized by “few buyers and sellers,
high risk, and institutionalized gaps between buyers and sellers,” and that these factors together
give rise to intermediation. Buyers and sellers in this market, he argues, are often well aware of
each other’s availability as a trading partner. That is, an aspiring CEO or business school dean
may well know which jobs are open or likely to come open, and a board of directors or university
provost may well know which candidates are looking. But Khurana argues direct communication
between the parties is diﬃcult, and the search ﬁrm plays an important role in legitimating the
relationship. Finlay and Coverdill (1998) describe a number of “soft” dimensions on which
search ﬁrms attempt to assess ﬁt with client ﬁrm needs, while Beaverstock, Faulconbridge and
Hall (2009) stress legitimization of potential trading relationships in their study of European
search ﬁrms. A richer understanding of this process would help provide some nuance and
realism to basic models of search and matching.
3.2.4 Firms Accessing Social Networks
For decades, social scientists have studied the role of informal social connections on labor
markets (Granovetter, 1974). While it is by now well documented that social networks matter
in labor markets, it is somewhat less clear why they matter. Do networks simply facilitate the
search for job openings by potential employees? To what extent do network connections play
a role in screening? To what extent does ﬁrm-level decision-making inﬂuence the process of
matching through employees’ social networks?
To illustrate this question, consider the recent study by Bayer, Topa and Ross (2008),
which uses detailed Census data on individuals’ precise Boston-area residence and employment
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likely to work together than individuals who live close to each other, but not on the same
block. Thinness of local housing markets means it is hard to imagine this result is driven by a
correlation in unobservables at the block level, so this study is a convincing identiﬁcation of a
local network eﬀect on labor market matches. The study is unfortunately silent on the precise
mechanism through which the neighborhood eﬀects operate. Do neighbors simply mention job
openings to each other when waiting at the bus stop? Or are the social connections between
neighbors suﬃciently strong that employers can rely on a current employee’s recommendation to
hire a neighbor? If so, under what circumstances should an employer trust a current employee’s
recommendation?
Many of the models of how social networks impact labor markets are of the “black box” vari-
ety, and focus solely on the role of the network in transmitting information about job openings.
Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004), for example, use a network model of job search to oﬀer
an explanation for persistent race-based diﬀerences in labor market participation. Individuals
randomly receive information about job openings, and can either act on those opportunities
themselves or pass information to contacts. This mechanism gives rise to a positive correlation
in employment status among individuals who are connected to each other. If there are costs
associated with remaining in the labor force, those connected to a good network will be more
willing to bear these costs than those who are not. See Ionnides and Loury (2004) for a recent
survey of research on job networks and inequality.
We focus our attention on the part of the literature that features an active role for employers
in accessing social networks. Saloner (1985) oﬀers a model of a ﬁrm that uses an “old boy”
network as a screening mechanism. Job seekers have heterogeneous ability, and are assumed to
be unable to signal. Each employee has access to one of two “referees,” who privately observes
a signal that is related to the job seeker’s productivity. Referees then communicate a hire/don’t
hire recommendation to the employer. Saloner shows that despite the diﬀerence in objective
between the employer and the reference — employers are proﬁt-maximizers, while referees care
about both placement rates and the quality of their contacts who are placed — the equilibrium
features truth-telling and ﬁrst-best hiring choices.
Montgomery (1991) oﬀers a model in which a ﬁrm can screen by hiring the social contacts
of its current employees. Current employees are randomly endowed with social ties to potential
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type (productive or not) as the current employee. In the ﬁrst period of this model, employers
hire with no knowledge of worker productivity, so the market clears at a single wage. Employers
then learn the productivity of their current employees and can make wage oﬀers to potential
employees who are tied to current employees. Firms with good-type ﬁrst period employees
make high wage oﬀers to the ties of those employees, and earn proﬁts due to some informational
monopsony power.
Casella and Hanaki (2006, 2008) move this literature — in what we think is a very pro-
ductive direction — by explicitly considering two channels through which ﬁrms can hire, and
modeling job-seekers’ incentives to reach employers through each channel. They begin with the
Montgomery (1991) model, and endogenize the formation of networks. At cost λN, a young
worker can establish a connection with an older worker. As in Montgomery, young workers are
disproportionately likely to establish links to older workers of the same type: conditional on
forming a link, the probability that the two connected workers have the same type is αN > 1
2.
Unlike Montgomery’s analysis, however, employees who don’t form a network link still have
options. At cost λS, workers can attempt to signal — by, perhaps, acquiring a credential such
as schooling. High (low) types succeed at acquiring the signal with probability αS (1 − αS).
Importantly, both networks and signals have the potential to assist the employer in screening
worker types.
Casella and Hanaki then ask where employers will prefer to look for workers. For the case
where networking is free (λN = 0), they ﬁnd that referral-based hiring is almost always preferred
by employers, even when, in equilibrium, certiﬁcation is more informative. The key intuition
here is simply that referrals allow the ﬁrm to privately screen, while certiﬁcation is, by nature,
public. Certiﬁed job-seekers are known by all employers to be disproportionately likely to be
high ability, and therefore their wages are bid up and all rents ﬂow to the worker. Referred
job-seekers are somewhat less likely to be high ability than certiﬁed in this case, but because
of the ﬁrm’s informational monopsony it is able to capture rents.
When both forms of information transmission by workers are costly, the workers will compare
the expected informational rent from pursuing either to the up-front cost. Networking always
necessitates rent-sharing with the ﬁrm, so workers only pursue it if it is either less costly or if it
is more precise as an indicator of ability. We see, in the work of Casella and Hanaki, the seeds of
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hiring practice and examine its eﬃcacy. But real ﬁrms face a portfolio of choices over how to
recruit. If we are to understand ﬁrm-level variation in hiring strategy, we need more models in
which ﬁrms must choose how to access the labor market. We believe that future work along
these lines can proceed in a number of directions. It would be useful, ﬁrst, to expand the range
of hiring venues available to ﬁrms. Second, researchers will need to introduce various forms
of ﬁrm-level heterogeneity (both observable and unobservable). Third, ability is completely
general in the Casella and Hanaki model, and it would be useful to know how match-speciﬁcity
of ability impacts hiring channel choice. Fourth, search is missing from this model. Finally, it
would be useful to understand to what extent rents associated with good employment matches
can be captured by the referring employee.
The empirical literature on ﬁrm-level choices when accessing employees’ social networks is
still in its infancy. Most large, nationally representative datasets contain little information that
could be used to do within-ﬁrm comparisons of employees hired via diﬀerent means. This makes
it diﬃcult to rule out unobserved ﬁrm eﬀects as an explanation for diﬀerences in wages across
hiring method. And studies of ﬁrms’ personnel records — often performed by sociologists —
suﬀer from potential limits on generalizability. Much work remains to be done in this area, but
we next survey the extant research.
Simon and Warner (1992) develop a search model of referrals from various sources (employees
among them). Their model assumes the role of referrals is to reduce the employer’s ex ante
uncertainty about worker productivity. Workers exogenously receive an oﬀer either through
a referral or through non-referral means. Because the better information results in better ex
ante matches, Simon and Warner predict that referred workers will receive higher up-front
wages, have lower wage growth (conditional on continued employment), and lower turnover
probabilities. Support for all three assertions is found in data from the 1972 Survey of Natural
and Social Scientists and Engineers. However, the data does not permit any within-ﬁrm analysis
of diﬀerent hiring practices, so it is diﬃcult to rule out the hypothesis that diﬀerences in the
ﬁrms hiring via referrals (rather than the referral method itself) is driving the results.
Kugler (2003) builds eﬃciency wages into a model of referrals, and derives an equilibrium
in which industries that pay eﬃciency wages prefer to hire through referral, both because
connected workers can engage in peer monitoring and because markets where referrals are
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to engage in more referral-based hiring, and individuals hired by employee referral earn higher
wages. Again, however, it is diﬃcult to rule out various forms of ﬁrm-level heterogeneity as an
alternative to the eﬃciency wage explanation.
Mosca and Pastore (2008) study the personnel records of organizations — public, private for-
proﬁt, and private non-proﬁt — that provide social services in Italy. Unusual in this literature,
they ﬁnd that being hired through informal networks bring a substantial wage penalty (6.5%)
for employees hired to public agencies. Interestingly, those hired through “public competitions”
— which, presumably, could play the same role as signal in the Casella and Hanaki model —
earn a 7 to 32% wage premium. Diﬀerences in hiring method account for a large fraction of the
overall variation in wages across organization types.
Antoninis (2006) studies the personnel records of 209 employees of an Egyptian manufac-
turing ﬁrm. Conditional on observables such as experience and education, workers hired on the
recommendation of someone holding direct knowledge of the new employee’s productivity (an
old work colleague) earned higher wages, on average, and this eﬀect was larger for employees
hired into higher skilled jobs. New workers hired on the recommendation of friends or family
received no wage premium, and may have taken a wage discount in lesser skilled occupations.
Organizational sociologists have conducted some excellent single-ﬁrm studies of social net-
works in hiring practices. Fernandez and Weinberg (1997) study hiring processes used for four
entry-level jobs at a retail bank in the early 1990s. Because the ﬁrm rewarded current employees
for referring new hires, the source of initial contact between the ﬁrm and each job candidate
was carefully tracked. Fernandez and Weinberg (1997) document several ways in which referred
candidates diﬀer from non-referred. First, referred candidates were more likely to ﬁt the skill
proﬁle desired by the ﬁrm. Second, referred candidates disproportionately applied for jobs
where there were fewer applicants, which suggests the ﬁrm was relying on its employees’ net-
works more heavily when it was having trouble drawing applicants through other means. Third,
referred candidates are both more likely to get interviewed and more likely to receive a job oﬀer,
even conditional on observables. Thus, it appears that this ﬁrm is using employee referrals in
matching, search, and screening. It would be interesting to know whether the ﬁrm still uses
referrals extensively when it is not having trouble ﬁnding applicants; presumably search costs
have been aﬀected by the possibility of internet recruiting for entry level positions like these.
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they ﬁnd that new hires identiﬁed through a referral are no less likely to turn over than hires
identiﬁed through other means, suggesting that better job matches are not uncovered through
referrals. Employees hired through referrals are, however, more likely to turn over when the
referrer turns over, suggesting that social connections matter both pre- and post-hiring. Fer-
nandez et al. (2000) close with a call for a greater dialogue between economic theory and
case-study-based empirical work, which we endorse.
3.2.5 Employer-to-Employer Transitions and “Raids”
To what extent do ﬁrms look to other ﬁrms’ employees — rather than the pool of unemployed
job seekers or those just entering the labor market — to ﬁll vacancies? And what factors
facilitate and impede employer-to-employer job transitions?
Employer-to-employer job transitions appear to be fairly common. Fallick and Fleischman
(2004) use the Current Population Survey’s dependent interviewing techniques to measure the
extent of employer-to-employer job transitions in the United States. They report that 2.6
percent of employed persons change jobs each month. This ﬁgure is comparable in magnitude
to the number of people moving from employment out of the labor force, and is twice as large
as the number of people who move from employment to unemployment. Fallick and Fleischman
further report that almost 40% of new jobs started between 1994 and 2003 were employer-to-
employer transitions, a ﬁgure that supports the importance of on-the-job search.
The eﬃcacy of “raids” as a source of new employees depends on two main factors. First, to
what extent is employee productivity ﬁrm-speciﬁc? In settings where ﬁrm-speciﬁc matching or
skill acquisition are important, we would expect to see less employer-to-employer movement of
employees. Second, how does the labor market learn about the productivity of employees? If
learning is symmetric — in that the current employer and potential future employers observe
the same information regarding worker productivity — then raiders can bid for other employers’
workers without fear of a winner’s curse. If learning is asymmetric, then informational problems
can impede employer-to-employer worker ﬂows (Greenwald, 1986).
Models of symmetric employer learning have been used to explain a number of facts about
wage growth over time. Farber and Gibbons (1996) develop a model in which education or
other employee characteristics observable to labor market participants convey information about
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and update accordingly. Consistent with the model, they show that time-invariant unobserv-
ables (the AFQT, for example) explain more of the variability in wages as workers gain labor
market experience. Altonji and Pierret (2001) enrich this framework by showing that if ﬁrms
statistically discriminate using education, then education should hold less explanatory power
for wages as workers gain experience. This assertion is supported in NLSY data.
Lazear (1986) considers a model of raids under symmetric learning. An incumbent ﬁrm
hires a worker with ex ante unknown ability to a job with a downward rigid wage. The worker’s
productivity at the incumbent ﬁrm is revealed. The worker’s productivity at a potential raider
is given by his productivity at the incumbent plus a random positive or negative shock. The
main result is that it is the good workers who are raided. This is because raids happen under
two conditions: (1) the worker’s productivity is higher at the raider than at the incumbent, and
(2) the worker’s productivity at the raider is higher than the worker’s wage at the incumbent.
Tranaes (2001) allows ﬁrms to endogenously select whether to attempt to hire a currently
employed worker or hire from the pool of unemployed. He assumes symmetric learning — all
potential employers can observe the abilities of all employees — but assumes that it is not
possible for ﬁrms to observe abilities of workers who are not currently employed. Hiring an
employed worker is costly because the ﬁrm must oﬀer a higher wage than the incumbent, but
hiring from the pool of unemployed is likely to yield a worker of low quality. Equilibrium in
the model features unemployment even for good workers (separations happen exogenously). As
raiding becomes more diﬃcult (proxied by an exogenous friction), unemployment falls as hiring
from the pool of unemployed becomes more attractive. Because raids impose a negative exter-
nality on unemployed job searchers, social welfare is strictly improved if raids are prohibited.
Note the model does not included any gains from matching.
The literature on asymmetric learning has focused to a large extent on how incumbent
employers might exploit their informational advantage. Waldman (1984) considers how the
desire of an incumbent ﬁrm to preserve its informational advantage can distort job assignments
and promotions within a ﬁrm. In Waldman’s model, rival employers cannot observe a worker’s
productivity directly, and instead make inferences about productivity from job assignment. The
main ﬁndings are that the information asymmetry causes the incumbent ﬁrm to tie wages to
jobs rather than productivity and also to distort job assignments away from ﬁrst-best.
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applied in a variety of theoretical models. Milgrom and Oster (1987) show that asymmetric
learning can distort incentives for human capital investments for workers with high unobserved
ability. Bernhardt (1995) applies Waldman’s idea to promotion decisions, and compares the
cost (from ineﬃcient job assignment) and beneﬁt (from reduced labor market competition) of
delaying promotions. This cost is higher for more able workers, which may explain fast-track
promotion paths in organizations. Scoones and Bernhardt (1998) show that if wages are at-
tached to promotions (due to asymmetric learning), then employee human capital investment
incentives may be distorted toward skills that will lead to promotions. If a general skill in-
vestment is eﬃcient, employees may prefer to make a ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment if doing so is the
surest path to promotion.
Of greater interest here is how asymmetric learning aﬀects strategies pursued by raiding
ﬁrms, and research on this question is somewhat more limited. Waldman (1990) shows how
up-or-out promotion decisions — where a retention decision signals high productivity — can
provide incentives for general-purpose human capital investments even if such investments are
not directly observable to raiders. In Waldman’s model, a crucial role of the retention decision is
to spur labor-market competition from raiders, as this improves ex ante incentives. Bernhardt
and Scoones (1993) consider a raider who must make a decision about whether to invest in
learning whether an incumbent ﬁrm’s employee is a good match. The incumbent can deter
such an investment (and hence deter wage competition in the event the raider determines the
employee is a good match with the raider) by making preemptive wage oﬀers.
Empirical evidence on symmetric vs. asymmetric learning is, perhaps not surprisingly,
broadly in support of the notion that both models hold some explanatory power, depending on
context. As noted above, Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001) oﬀer evi-
dence consistent with symmetric learning. DeVaro and Waldman (2009) show that promotion
decisions in the Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) data appear to conform to signaling theo-
ries stemming from asymmetric learning; speciﬁcally, they show that wage increases associated
with promotions are smaller when worker education levels are higher. Schonberg (2007) devel-
ops a learning model with endogenous mobility that allows for both forms of employer learning.
She argues that under symmetric learning, job movers and stayers should have the same average
ability (as proxied by AFQT), while movers should be lower ability under asymmetric learning.
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than stayers (because the raider lacks the incumbent’s direct observations of productivity). She
estimates the model using the NLSY data studied by Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji
and Pierret (2001) and ﬁnds support primarily for symmetric learning, with some support for
asymmetric learning for more educated workers. Kahn (2009) also uses the NLSY but identiﬁes
the relative importance of symmetric and asymmetric learning using layoﬀs, economic condi-
tions at the time of starting a job, and diﬀerences across occupations. Like Schonberg (2007),
Kahn (2009) ﬁnds evidence of both types of learning. However, in contrast to Schonberg (2007),
she concludes that asymmetric learning is economically and statistically more important than
symmetric learning. Pinkston (2009) oﬀers a model in which raiders receive noisy private evalu-
ations of potential hires. Because raiders receive a signal the incumbent employer does not, the
raider can proﬁtably bid for the employee even in the absence of matching. The key empirical
prediction of the model is that as experience increases wages reﬂect evidence of public learning,
while as job tenure increases wages reﬂect private learning. Analysis of the NLSY supports
both forms of learning.
Our view is that this literature needs industry studies, of the type commonly seen in in-
dustrial organization economics. While important progress has been made on understanding
employer learning using aggregate data sets like the NLSY, it is likely the case that diﬀerent
markets vary dramatically in the extent to which asymmetric learning and matching are im-
portant. It is not hard to imagine that hiring another ﬁrm’s CEO would present a markedly
diﬀerent set of issues from hiring another ﬁrm’s retail clerk. We think the broad outlines of the
raiding problem are well understood, but what is needed is an understanding of how matching
and learning play out in speciﬁc labor markets. There are studies of a few such markets —
which we review next — but much more is needed.
Fallick, Fleischman and Rebitzer (2006) use the CPS to examine how employer-to-employer
ﬂows vary by industry and geographic region. Speciﬁcally, they examine interﬁrm mobility of
college educated men working in the computer industry, and ﬁnd the rate of such ﬂows to be
signiﬁcantly higher in California than elsewhere. Employer-to-employer transitions among this
group average 1.95% monthly nationwide, but are around 3% in California. The authors note
that rates of employer-to-employer job changes are no higher in Silicon Valley than in the rest
of California, which suggests that California law (which does not permit the enforcement of
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transitions outside of the computer industry are no higher in California than elsewhere in the
US. Thus, it appears that it is the interaction of California law with speciﬁc features of the
computer industry that drives this higher mobility.
There is a reasonably large literature on across-ﬁrm mobility of Chief Executive Oﬃcers.
One advantage of using this setting as a laboratory is that in the US both pay and perfor-
mance for these employees are publically observed, albeit noisily. Murphy and Zabojnik (2006)
document a striking trend in employer-to-employer ﬂows in this market. For ﬁrms appearing
in Forbes compensation surveys, between 1970 and 1979, just 14.9% of newly appointed CEOs
were hired from outside the ﬁrm. This ﬁgure rose to 17.2% in the 1980s, and 26.5% in the 1990s.
Murphy and Zabojnik develop a model in which managerial technology became more general
over this period. That is, due to standardization of various accounting, management and IT
practices in the US economy, it became easier for outsiders to manage large US ﬁrms. An
associated increase in wage competition for the most able managers is oﬀered as an explanation
for the large increases in CEO pay over the same period.
Fee and Hadlock (2003) study a sample of managers who were hired from outside to either
the CEO position or a senior non-CEO managerial role. They report that the prior employers
of outside CEOs tended to have above-average stock price performance prior to the manager’s
departure, as measured by stock returns. This pattern does not hold for outsiders hired to
non-CEO positions. They also report that the existence of an “heir-apparent” manager at
the incumbent ﬁrm — a non-CEO manager who has been tagged as the likely next CEO —
increases the likelihood that other managers at that ﬁrm will depart for better employment
opportunities elsewhere. Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2004) document that outsider CEOs
are associated with larger subsequent improvements in operating performance.
Hiring from outside can also have implications for the incentives of current employees. Chan
(1996) considers the eﬀects of this choice in the context of promotion tournaments. External re-
cruitment reduces the likelihood that an insider will win the promotion tournament, and hence
weakens incentives. A ﬁrm can restore incentives by increasing the promotion-based wage diﬀer-
ential, but this may lead to increased rent-seeking eﬀorts on the part of insiders. Alternatively,
the ﬁrm can commit to hire from outside only if the external candidate is substantially better
than the insider. Thus, there is a tradeoﬀ between attracting good candidates from outside
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empirical evidence consistent with the hypothesis that ﬁrms hire external CEOs only when
the external candidates are considerably superior to internal candidates on observable dimen-
sions. The ﬁndings of Hassink and Russo (2008) run counter to this, however. Using matched
employee-employer data from the Netherlands, they ﬁnd that candidates hired internally into
open jobs earn a 15% wage premium (conditional on observables) compared to those hired from
outside.
Securities analysts — stock market observers who oﬀer forecasts of corporate earnings —
oﬀer another market where employer-to-employer job mobility can be easily tracked. This
setting has both advantages and disadvantages relative to the CEO context: analysts wages are
not commonly disclosed, but it is relatively easy to devise measures of employee performance
that can be compared pre- and post-mobility. Groysberg, Lee and Nanda (2008) ﬁnd that
star analysts who change jobs show a long-lasting reduction in job performance. This suggests
that, despite claims of industry observers, there may be substantial ﬁrm-speciﬁcity in analyst
skills that is lost upon job mobility. It is also possible that this is evidence of a winner’s curse
stemming from asymmetric learning. It is not clear how this set of facts is consistent with
equilibrium behavior by market participants, unless there is some gain that oﬀsets the losses
due to reduced performance.
3.2.6 Employer Search
While there is an enormous literature on employee job search, the literature on search by
employers is less developed. An early contribution by Rees (1966) focuses attention on two
channels of search. Employers can expand search on the extensive margin, by gathering more
applications. On the intensive margin, employers can expand search by gathering more infor-
mation on each potential applicant. More recently, researchers have examined choices over the
range of search activities a ﬁrm may engage in.
Barron, Bishop and Dunkelberg (1985) study the 1980 Employer Opportunity Pilot Project
(EOPP) survey, for which employers who had recently hired were asked about staﬀ hours spent
on recruiting, the number of applications received and interviews conducted, and wages for the
new hire. The paper is perhaps best known for a simple but striking fact: 90% of the job oﬀers
made by ﬁrms in this sample were accepted. The authors then relate these search choices to ﬁrm
43and job characteristics. A primary result is that ﬁrms spend more time on the search process
when the job requires larger training expenditures by the ﬁrm. Human capital theory suggests
ﬁrm-speciﬁc training generates rents, so ﬁrms will want to insure a good match prior to making
such investments. Firms also spend more time recruiting when the educational requirements for
the job are greater. Jobs that feature higher training expenditures by the ﬁrm are associated
with more hours spent interviewing. Finally, ﬁrm size appears to be correlated with recruiting
expenditures; a doubling in ﬁrm size increases the number of applicants per oﬀer by 10%.
Another early contribution is Holzer (1987). Again using the EOPP data (this time from
the 1982 wave), he shows that advertising openings to current employees is the most commonly
used recruitment method.6 Interviews and reference checks are overwhelmingly popular as
screening mechanisms. There is some evidence that employees hired through personal referrals
have higher productivity, lower turnover, and lower screening costs.
There is a fairly sizable empirical literature on vacancies. The approach taken here is from
search theory. Employers sequentially sample from a pool of potential employees with a known
ability distribution. A vacancy duration is simply the amount of time until the vacancy is ﬁlled.
Typical empirical design involves estimation of a hazard rate of vacancy ﬁlling, and examining
how this rate varies with characteristics of the job or ﬁrm. Data sources are mostly from one-oﬀ
surveys, which makes it diﬃcult to examine how the mechanism by which the vacancy is ﬁlled
is related to job tenure, wage growth, turnover and other measures of match success one would
like to examine.
In a series of papers, van Ours and Ridder (1991, 1992, 1993) examine a pair of Dutch
surveys on vacancies. van Ours and Ridder (1991) examine data from the Dutch Bureau of
Statistics and study how vacancy durations and vacancy ﬂows — deﬁned as the rate at which
new vacancies are created — varies over the business cycle. The authors estimate the vacancy
duration hazard rate and ﬁnd that vacancies ﬁll more slowly when the vacancy ﬂow rate is
higher. Jobs that require more education also ﬁll more slowly. Further, vacancy ﬂow is more
sensitive to the business cycle for low-education openings.
Using data from the Organization for Strategic Labor Market Research, van Ours and Ridder
(1992) again ﬁnd that higher educational requirements are associated with longer vacancy
6It is not clear in this entire literature whether the new hires are all external hires. If a ﬁrm advertises to its
current employees, the ﬁrm may want them to refer friends or apply for the job themselves.
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however, is to examine the timing of applications. van Ours and Ridder (1992) show that
the acceptance probability (that is, the probability a candidate accepts a job oﬀer) is zero
for the ﬁrst two weeks after the vacancy’s posting. The probability rises after the ﬁrst two
weeks, and stays high for another ten weeks. The arrival rate of applicants is very high for
the ﬁrst two weeks, essentially zero for the next two weeks, before rising again. The evidence
points to a non-sequential search strategy, where ﬁrms cast a net, draw in a pool of applicants,
simultaneously screen, then make an oﬀer or draw again. Thus, while employee search appears
to be sequential, employer search is not. van Ours and Ridder (1993) ﬁnd that employers spend
far more time on selection than on search. Mean application period — estimated oﬀ the hazard
rate of applications — is 3.1 weeks, while the mean selection period is 14.6 weeks (21.1 weeks
when university education is required). Thus, vacancy durations should be thought of not as
the duration of search but rather as a combination of search duration and screening duration.
This raises the question of whether the internet has aﬀected screening times; presumably the
process of screening on observables is considerably faster now than it was in 1992. Abbring
and van Ours (1994) also partition vacancy durations into search and selection period, and ﬁnd
that the ratio of unemployed to vacancies aﬀects search durations — longer when the ratio is
smaller — but not selection periods.
Barron, Berger and Black (1997) develop new theory on employer search when screening
expenditures (intensive search) are endogenous. They predict that vacancies for jobs requiring
more training will see both more applications before an oﬀer is made, and greater screening
expenditures per application. Analysis of four data sets from the US supports this contention.
Barron et al. (1997) also show that job oﬀers are rarely rejected, and that there seems to be no
pattern in the data on rejected oﬀers.
Burdett and Cunningham (1998), studying the 1982 EOPP data, echo many of the ﬁndings
of Barron et al. (1985). Firms undertake longer searches when the training expenditures asso-
ciated with the job are higher. Larger ﬁrms ﬁll vacancies faster, presumably because of easier
access to pools of employees. There is some evidence that jobs with high skill and/or education
requirements take longer to ﬁll. The primary distinction between the results in Burdett and
Cunningham (1998) and Barron et al. (1985) is that the later study examines vacancy duration
as its measure of selectivity in recruiting, while the earlier study used surveys of staﬀ hours.
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ﬁlling vacancies. When a vacancy is “young,” the hazard function is increasing, but as the
vacancy gets old the likelihood of ﬁlling it drops. Finally, the authors report that vacancy du-
rations are longer when the employer has advance notice that the vacancy will occur. Brencic
(2009c) conﬁrms this advance notice ﬁnding using detailed data on all employment vacancies in
Slovenia, and Brencic (2009a) ﬁnds (using Slovenian and US data) that ﬁrms also adjust hiring
standards when advance notice periods are expiring.
Another series of papers examines the Dutch “How Do Firms Recruit?” survey (conducted
for the Dutch Ministry of Social Aﬀairs). Gorter, Nijkamp and Rietveld (1996) study the
relation between recruitment strategy and vacancy duration. They ﬁrst estimate a multinomial
logit model of ﬁrst recruitment method choice — advertisements, informal channels, labor
oﬃce, or other — and then estimate vacancy duration. Advertisements are used more heavily
when the vacancy stipulates work experience, and the labor oﬃce is commonly used for low-
education jobs. Hazard rates for vacancy duration show that when informal recruitment is the
ﬁrst choice, the vacancy tends to ﬁll immediately or not at all. Further, advertised vacancies
ﬁll more slowly when education is required. Russo et al. (2000) use the same data set to
examine recruitment method choice and the rate of applicant arrival. They report that the
ﬂow of applicants is, not surprisingly, related to overall labor market conditions. Further, when
conditions are tight, employers adjust recruitment methods to use additional advertisements.
This method of recruitment is shown to have the largest impact on the ﬂow of applicants
Russo et al. (2001) build on this work to show that ﬁrms are less likely to hire currently
unemployed workers when conditions are tight. Finally, Van Ommeren and Russo (2008) argue
that sequential search implies that the number of rejected applicants should be proportional to
the number of vacancies. As an example, suppose a ﬁrm searches sequentially to ﬁll a single
vacancy, and must perform a costly screen on each candidate. If one-third of sampled applicants
pass the screen, then on average the ﬁrm will reject two applicants for each one it hires. This
reasoning implies the elasticity of the number of rejected applicants to vacancies should be one.
If, on the other hand, search is sequential, then there is no requirement that this elasticity be
unity. This observation forms the basis of a test. Sequential search is not rejected for informal
methods (social networks, school recruiting, and temp agencies), but is rejected when ﬁrms
access employment agencies and run advertisements.
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workers, and reports three main facts. First, most vacancies generate few applicants (less than
three, on average). Second, wage and non-wage aspects of the job inﬂuence the number of
applicants. Third, ﬁrms are more likely to grant an interview to workers who are currently
employed, but conditional on making it to the interview stage, currently unemployed workers
are no less likely to receive a job oﬀer. A small literature examines the duration of vacancies.
Andrews, Bradley, Stott and Upward (2008) note that while employees infrequently reject
job oﬀers, employers often allow vacancies to go unﬁlled, simply by withdrawing the vacancy
from the market. Using detailed data on vacancies from the UK’s Lancashire Career Services
Agency, they show that the hazard rate of ﬁlling a vacancy exhibits positive duration depen-
dence, while the hazard for withdrawal exhibits negative duration dependence.
Brencic (2009b) interacts the vacancies literature with that on Employment Protection
Legislation. She reasons ﬁrst that ﬁrms facing costly search — measured by the immediacy
with which a vacancy needs to be ﬁlled — may respond by relaxing hiring standards. Doing so,
however, can result in poor matches and hence greater likelihood of termination. This implies
a complementarity between relaxed hiring standards and temporary employment, especially in
cases where ﬁring is costly. Brencic examines this relation using very detailed data on vacancies
in Slovenia. During her sample period, there is no variation in ﬁring costs — although she
reports that changes in these costs occurred just after her sample period — so the test simply
examines the cross-sectional association between costly search, relaxation of hiring standards,
and temp employment. She ﬁnds that employers facing costly search tend to relax hiring
standards, but only when the position being hired for is temporary. She does not ﬁnd evidence
that employers switch permanent positions to temporary when reducing hiring standards, as
theory might suggest.
DeVaro (2005) adds both a new data source and an emphasis on starting wages. He studies
the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI), a large cross-sectional survey of employers
in four metropolitan areas of the United States. He ﬁrst documents that recruitment strategies
vary with ﬁrm and job characteristics. As prior literature ﬁnds, ﬁrms rely more heavily on
referrals when hiring for professional occupations. Next, he includes recruitment method in a
standard wage regression. While Casella and Hanaki (2006, 2008) would suggest that personal
referrals should be paid less conditional on human capital observables, there is little evidence
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DeVaro ﬁnds that referrals from friends and current employees are associated with small wage
premiums relative to those recruited via help-wanted signs, but there is essentially no statistical
diﬀerence between personal referrals and newspaper ads or school referrals. Clearly there is work
to be done to reconcile screening-based theories of network hiring with the facts.
DeVaro and Fields (2005) use the MCSUI as well, and regress worker performance (on a
100-scale, employer-reported) on indicators for recruitment and screening method, and ﬁrm
characteristics. Data show very little support for the assertion that recruiting and screen-
ing methods are related to performance. Conditional on ﬁrm, worker and job characteristics,
method of recruitment bears little relationship to subjectively assessed performance. The ap-
proach — using employer-evaluated performance as a dependent variable — is subject to some
criticism. Presumably employers would be pleased to hire a less able worker at a suﬃciently
discounted wage. It is not clear how one might combine wages with this numerical performance
score to get the net impact on the ﬁrm’s bottom line.
DeVaro (2008) uses the same data to estimate a dynamic, discrete-choice structural model of
recruitment. The ﬁrm is modeled as choosing recruitment strategies and wage oﬀers over time
to try to ﬁll a vacancy. The primary advantage of this structural approach is that it permits the
study of the eﬀects of various counterfactuals on ﬁrms’ recruitment policies. It does come at a
cost of some generality, however. Here a ﬁrm is modeled as choosing either formal or informal
recruiting methods at the beginning of the recruiting period, but Holzer (1987) and others show
that ﬁrms tend to use multiple recruiting methods simultaneously. The analysis suggests that,
due to higher oﬀer-acceptance probabilities, the ﬁrm will tend to oﬀer lower wages when engaged
in informal recruiting. Note that this is a diﬀerent rationale for the informal-recruitment/lower-
wages channel than that oﬀered by Casella and Hanaki (2006, 2008). Counterfactual simulations
suggest that wage subsidies, “information policies” that improve match qualities through formal
methods, and changes in the degree of employee heterogeneity can have important eﬀects on
ﬁrms’ recruitment decisions and wages. Wage subsidies shift ﬁrms toward informal means, in
part because the subsidy makes employment more attractive and employees identiﬁed through
informal means are (assumed to be) more likely to accept. Information policies, modeled on the
Workforce Investment Act of 1991, push recruitment toward formal channels to take advantage
of improved matching. Increases in employee heterogeneity shift recruiting to formal methods
48through an order-statistic eﬀect. Formal methods allow quicker sampling and reviewing many
applications quickly and selecting the best is most valuable when the variance of match quality
is high.
Finally, some papers consider a potential complementarity between various recruitment
and screening strategies. Under the complmentarity hypothesis, one might expect positive
interaction eﬀects between screening and recruitment methods. In the MCSUI data, DeVaro
and Fields (2008) ﬁnd very little support for the complementarity hypothesis. Interaction terms
in performance regressions are typically negative.
Bartling et al. (2009) argue that choice of recruitment method — screening, in particular
— can have complementarities with discretion, rent-sharing, and wages. In an experimental
setting, they document the endogenous emergence of two markedly diﬀerent organizational
design strategies. One focuses on control, with little discretion, no rent sharing, low wages,
and no screening, and one focuses on trust, with discretion, high wages, rent sharing, and
screening. A key driver of this choice is the information available to employers about potential
employees pre-hiring. When employers can observe a signal about employee past performance,
many employers conditioned wages on this signal; this gives employees a reputational incentive
to reciprocate employer trust, which facilitates discretion. When no such signal is available,
employers cannot condition wages on past performance — so no career concerns operate — and
employers tend not to trust.
3.2.7 Recruiting on the Internet
As rates of Internet adoption rose in the 1990s, participants in labor markets began to exper-
iment with ways to use this tool in economic activity. Early attempts in this direction are
summarized by Autor (2001b), who hypothesizes a number of ways that the Internet might
aﬀect labor markets, including the processes through which employers and employees match.
He points out that the Internet may improve aggregate match eﬃciency by reducing search
costs, thus allowing both ﬁrms and workers to consider many potential trading partners much
more quickly than before. This eﬀect may be ameliorated by concerns about adverse selection.
Because electronic communication makes it easy for workers to apply for many jobs — even
jobs they (privately) know themselves to be poorly suited for — recruiting on the Internet may
lead to sharply increased screening costs for employers. Thought of another way, applying for
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plication cost, the signal generated by the application process (as in the Spence (1973) model)
has become less meaningful and the application process is less good at inducing applicants to
self-select eﬃciently.
The years since 2001 have seen a trickle rather than a ﬂood of research about online job
matching. Much of the existing research focuses on search by potential employees, rather
than on recruiting by employers. Kuhn and Skuterud (2004), for example, use the Current
Population Survey Computer and Internet Supplements to examine selection into internet job
search and unemployment durations among online job searchers. They ﬁnd that internet search
is associated with lower unemployment durations, but that this eﬀect is entirely explained by
worker observables such as education and occupation. Once these observables are controlled for,
internet job search is associated with similar, or in some speciﬁcations, longer unemployment
durations. Kuhn and Skuterud conclude that either Internet job search is ineﬀective at reducing
unemployment durations, or that the pool of Internet job searchers is adversely selected.
Stevenson (2009) points out that 22% of workers who began a new job in mid-2002 cited
the Internet as the primary means through which they found the job. She further reports that
state-level Internet penetration is associated with a reallocation of job search activity, and an
increase in the overall level of job search. Finally, Stevenson documents that most Internet
job-searchers are employed, and that employed workers who search online are more likely to
experience an employer-to-employer job transition than those who do not search online.
Bagues and Labini (2009) analyze the impact of the Italian AlmaLaurea online job board,
and exploit the fact that diﬀerent universities joined the board at diﬀerent times to construct a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator of the impact of the online board on labor market outcomes.
Notably the AlmaLaurea is unlike the US-based internet job boards studied by Stevenson (2009)
in that it provides employers with detailed records — supplied by the colleges not the students
— on students’ academic careers. This compulsory disclosure may serve to mitigate adverse
selection in the labor market. Bagues and Labine ﬁnd that the AlmaLaurea reduces the likeli-
hood of unemployment by 1.6 percentage points, increased wages by 3 percentage points, and
also increased the likelihood of regional mobility for university graduates. The study is silent,
however, about whether the job board improves employers’ ability to ﬁnd high ability workers
or those with high idiosyncratic match values. Understanding this distinction has important im-
50plications for the eﬀects of internet hiring on inequality and whether some potential employees
will be made worse oﬀ.
Some researchers have studied the question of how ﬁrms incorporate the internet into re-
cruiting strategies. Hadass (2004) uses proprietary data from a US-based multinational ﬁrm to
examine the impact of internet recruiting on various aspects of job match. Online recruiting at
the ﬁrm accounted for just 0.2% of the ﬁrm’s hires in 1996, but grew to 20% by 2002. A Cox
duration model shows that Internet recruiting leads to job durations that are statistically iden-
tical to that found for print advertising, but durations that are signiﬁcantly (both statistically
and economically) shorter than those for employee referral and college recruiting. Employee
referrals and college recruiting lead to job durations that are 1.7 times as long as those found
for internet and print.
Nakamura, Shaw, Freedman, Nakamura and Pyman (2009) oﬀer a descriptive discussion of
modern e-recruiting services, and give a list of ﬁve key facts. First, they point out that the
main commercial jobsites are not standalone corporate entities. Monster, CareerBuilder and
HotJobs are all parts of larger ﬁrms that engage in multiple activities. Second, online recruiting
allows ﬁrms to search more widely and consider a larger variety of applicants. Third, there are
substantial returns to scale in online recruiting. The costs to a large employer of advertising to
ﬁnd ten employees of a given type is not substantially larger than the cost of advertising to ﬁnd
one. This fact would seem to explain why large US retailers account for such a large fraction
of overall internet job search traﬃc. (Target’s career site by itself accounted for more internet
traﬃc in early 2007 than the site that hosts all US federal government jobs.) Fourth, in line
with the results in Stevenson (2009), online methods allow ﬁrms to access currently employed
workers who are only passive job seekers. Fifth, US-based ﬁrms currently dominate online job
search worldwide.
Brencic and Norris (2009) focus on some speciﬁc choices facing employers when posting job
openings online. They collect a sample of job postings made to Monster.com and compare job
openings that the employer reports must be ﬁlled immediately to openings where employers do
not make this statement. When employers report greater impatience, they also tend to list more
information about the job application process and less information about hiring requirements.
Further, openings for jobs that need to ﬁlled immediately tend to be withdrawn from the job
board more quickly.
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employer preferences for gender, age, height, and beauty. Labor-market discrimination based
on such characteristics is illegal in much of the world, but, strikingly, remains legal in the
world’s largest labor market. Surprisingly, online job postings in China often contain explicit
requirements on such “US-prohibited” characteristics: 90% of ﬁrms posting 50 or more ads in
the Kuhn and Shen sample expressed at least one such preference. Notably, ﬁrms are less likely
to express such a preference when educational requirements for the job are more stringent.
3.2.8 Organizational Demography
A developing literature in economics examines organizational demography; that is, factors that
inﬂuence the demographic characteristics of those hired by the ﬁrm. Giuliano, Levine and
Leonard (2009) use personnel data from a large US retail chain to show that the race or ethnicity
of the hiring manager appears to be an important determinant of the racial composition of new
hires. While store ﬁxed eﬀects — which capture both store characteristics and characteristics
of the store’s local labor market — are the largest determinant of a store’s racial mix of hiring,
Giuliano et al. (2009) ﬁnd that the race of the hiring manager matters as well. Speciﬁcally,
they report that non-black managers hire more whites and fewer blacks than black managers.
Estimates suggest that the race of the store manager shifts the black employee share by around
four percentage points. On average, black managers hire workforces that are 21 percent black,
while non-black managers hire just 17 percent black. Similar eﬀects are found for Hispanic vs.
white managers, when restricting attention to stores where Hispanics make up 30 percent or
more of the local population.
It is not clear what accounts for this propensity for racial match of hiring. It is possible
that hiring managers are accessing their social networks (which may be partially segregated by
race) to identify promising employees. Another hypothesis is that there are direct productivity
eﬀects, if, for example, black managers communicate better with black subordinates. This
pattern could also be accounted for by preferences of managers or employees. It is diﬃcult to
disentangle these eﬀects, but Giuliano et al. (2009) show that store-level sales does not appear
to be signiﬁcantly impacted by the racial match of the manager and employees.
Oyer and Schaefer (2010) examine the organizational demography of large US law ﬁrms.
Using lawyer biographies posted to ﬁrms’ web sites, they document substantial across-ﬁrm
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the law schools where they hire. Oyer and Schaefer ﬁnd that for the average ﬁrm, the probability
that two lawyers selected at random attended the same law school is about six percent higher
than this probability for two attorneys selected at random from the sample. Some ﬁrms pursue
a fairly unconcentrated hiring strategy, and the distribution of law schools attended by their
attorneys is comparable to the overall sample distribution of law schools. Other ﬁrms appear to
hire from a narrow set of law schools located in close geographic proximity to the ﬁrm’s oﬃces.
Still others hire nationally, but only from the very top law schools.
Oyer and Schaefer ﬁnd that about a third of the observed variation in oﬃce-level law-school
shares can be accounted for by simple geographic proximity. Law oﬃces, by and large, dis-
proportionately tend to hire from close law schools. Higher ranked law ﬁrms also tend to hire
from high-ranked law schools, and this eﬀect explains a small additional amount of variation
in hiring practices. Even conditional on geography and reputation match, they report a strong
association between associate-level law-school shares and partner-level shares. They estimate
that when a ﬁrm’s partner law-school share is higher by one percentage point, the ﬁrm’s asso-
ciate law-school share is higher by around 0.6 percentage points. As with the study by Giuliano
et al. (2009), it is diﬃcult to say whether social networks, production complementarities, or
employee preferences are driving this relation. Wage and/or productivity measures are required
to more speciﬁcally identify the causes and eﬀects of these relationships.
3.2.9 Hiring, Agglomeration, and Firm Location
The optimal matching and searching processes that ﬁrms engage in will vary across local labor
markets. Larger and more concentrated populations typically lead to thicker labor markets
which may reduce search costs and can also lead to better average matches between ﬁrms and
workers. While this will tend to increase surplus, thicker labor markets also lead to greater
competition in the labor market. So, while total surplus may be greater in thicker labor markets,
ﬁrms may have to settle for a smaller share of that surplus because it is more diﬃcult to generate
monopsony power.
There is a large literature on ﬁrm location and, more speciﬁcally, agglomeration economies,
that studies the relationship between ﬁrm co-location and other variables. One of the factors
that often lead similar employers to locate near each other is a source of certain types of
53worker (such as skilled workers near university towns.)7 However, ﬁrm location decisions and
the supply of labor in a given labor market will clearly aﬀect one another, so it is diﬃcult to
generate credible causal statements about the eﬀect of either one of these.
Several recent studies have analyzed the relationship between labor market thickness, ﬁrm
location, and worker/ﬁrm matching. Wheeler (2001) develops a model where capital and worker
skill are complements. In this model, thicker labor markets lead to higher productivity, greater
wage inequality, and higher returns to skill. He cites and generates empirical evidence that is
consistent with all these ideas. Andersson et al. (2007) put this same basic idea to somewhat
more rigorous scrutiny. They use matched employer/employee data from California and Florida
to show that there is more assortative matching between “high quality” workers and “high
quality” ﬁrms in thicker labor markets. They show that establishment-level productivity is
related to match quality and argue that the relationship between better matching and thick
labor markets can explain a substantial portion of the urban productivity premium. Freedman
(2009) looks at similar issues, with a focus on the software industry in a single (unnamed)
state. He ﬁrst derives a model where ﬁrm/worker match quality is based on diﬀerences in the
Human Resources packages oﬀered by ﬁrms and variation in employee preferences. Empirically,
he ﬁnds that agglomeration of software ﬁrms is associated with higher wages, bigger ﬁrms, and
less wage dispersion, as his model would suggest.
Garicano and Hubbard (2007) and Garicano and Hubbard (2009) analyze how market thick-
ness aﬀects the organization of law ﬁrms and the kind of work lawyers perform. In Garicano
and Hubbard (2007), they show that bigger markets allow lawyers to specialize more, to be
more likely to work in a hierarchy, and to have more leveraged hierarchies. That is, labor
market thickness aﬀects the matching process in that more senior attorneys can better leverage
their unique skills. Garicano and Hubbard (2009) ﬁnd that lawyers become more specialized
as market size increases. The analysis drop the largest legal markets, so that they can be sure
they are isolating the eﬀect on the organization of work (rather than the type of work.) But
they also show that some the most skill-intensive and expensive work gets done in a few big
cities, indicating that ﬁrms and lawyers locate there to do certain types of work.
7Local labor markets are just one of several important reasons ﬁrms agglomerate. See Ellison and Glaeser
(1997) and Ellison and Glaeser (1999) who look at other sources of “natural advantage” and “spillovers” that
drive co-location of similar ﬁrms.
543.3 Post-Hiring Matching — Retention and Displacement
This section is titled “Hiring” because no labor market matching can take place without an
initial employment contract being formed. But labor market matching is constantly going on
as ﬁrms decide who to retain and workers decide whether to engage in on-the-job search. While
there is a large literature on the eﬀects of job loss, there is relatively little on ﬁrms’ choices
about retention and worker displacement. We have already touched on the post-hiring matching
issues in our discussions of ﬁring “risky” workers that turn out to have low productivity, raids,
and up-or-out systems. We now add a short discussion of the literature on ﬁrms’ strategies
regarding retaining and displacing workers.
Gibbons and Katz (1991) extended basic adverse selection models of hiring to the ﬁring
context. They derive a model where ﬁrms, when faced with a negative shock to productivity,
lay oﬀ their less productive workers. Other ﬁrms draw inferences about workers’ ability when a
prior employer selectively chooses who to lay oﬀ, while no such inference is possible for workers
who lose their job because their ﬁrm shuts down altogether. Consistent with the model, they
ﬁnd that workers who are laid oﬀ from a continuing operation suﬀer more from job loss than
workers who lose their jobs when their establishment shuts down. Though others have called
the empirical results of Gibbons and Katz (1991) into question (see, for example, Krashinsky
(2002)), the important conceptual distinction between “layoﬀs” and “plant closings” has been
widely accepted in the literature. 8
When the match-speciﬁc component of productivity is important and ﬁrms pay workers
something close to the marginal product of their eﬀort, ﬁrms can (at least in principle) let
employees eﬃciently separate from the ﬁrm when they need to reduce staﬀ. That is, under the
right conditions, there should not be a substantial adverse selection problem in oﬀering volun-
tary severance packages and doing so may enhance the ﬁrm’s reputation and/or be necessary
to honor written or implicit labor contracts. Pencavel (2001) studies this issue by looking at
which University of California employees accepted buyouts in the early 1990ms. As one might
expect, larger severance beneﬁts increase the probability of a worker accepting a buyout. But
8Oyer and Schaefer (2000) further break down layoﬀs into those that are driven by economic issues and those
driven by an individual’s poor performance (“ﬁrings”). They show that ﬁrms appear to choose which of these
ways to displace workers at least partially based on the ﬁring costs associated with each.
55Pencavel also shows that it is otherwise very diﬃcult to predict who will accept buyouts. Kim
(2003) shows that the University of California got positive selection in one set of layoﬀs, because
faculty whose productivity had been on the decline were more likely to accept buyouts.
There is one group that has been closely studied (over-studied?) in terms of job dismissal —
CEOs of large American corporations. As with incentives, CEOs present an unusually public
group in terms of observability of dismissal and performance.9 However, CEOs are also not
very representative of employees more generally because of the large cost of not replacing a bad
CEO, the fact that they may earn substantial rents, and the inability to move them to a new
job within the ﬁrm if they are not working out as CEO.
Two recent papers have taken a careful look at the drivers of CEO dismissal. Both Jenter
and Kanaan (2008) and Kaplan and Minton (2009) ﬁnd that CEO turnover is sensitive to
ﬁrm performance and that the eﬀects of industry and total stock market performance are not
completely ﬁltered out of the relationship between performance and forced turnover. Kaplan
and Minton (2009) also show that forced turnovers have become more responsive to turnover
over time and question whether turnover decisions made by boards of directors are generally
eﬃcient. While these results are very useful for corporate governance scholars, it is hard to
draw broad conclusions about displacement from these workers.
The availability of large employer-employee matched datasets has the potential to generate
insights into displacement strategies of ﬁrms, though these data do not generally distinguish
between layoﬀs, ﬁrings, and quits. Matching to the next job or to unemployment records may
help narrow down the potential reasons for leaving, however. In the absence of being able to
make such distinctions, even these rich datasets have little to add relative to the factors we
already know to be associated with job loss (see, for example, Kletzer (1998).)
3.4 Do Hiring Practices Matter?
We conclude this section by asking a big question that has received far too little attention: Do
hiring practices matter for the performance of an organization or a business unit?
There is limited evidence on this question, mostly coming from the growing literature on
9One minor complication is determining whether a departing CEO is leaving voluntarily, but researchers
have developed credible methods for separating voluntary and involuntary departures. See, for example, Parrino
(1997).
56productivity eﬀects of ﬁrm-level human resource management choices (and see Bloom and Van
Reenen, 2010 in this Volume for a thorough review of this literature). As we noted above,
the Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) study of steel ﬁnishing lines considers “extensive
selection procedures” as one of a set of complementary HR practices that appear to have
boosted productivity. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) show that one hiring practice
— screening for education — appears to be part of a bundle of organizational practices that
complement investments in information technology. Adoption of this set of complementary
practices is associated with higher organizational value added. Bloom and Van Reenen (2007)
conduct a survey of management practices and show that a variety of performance metrics
— productivity, proﬁtability, and sales growth, among others — are associated with good
management practice. Their survey questions address a broad range of management practices,
and among them is a series of questions about the ﬁrm’s attitude toward attracting human
capital.
We think highly of these papers, but also believe this literature can be moved forward in
a couple of ways. First, these papers are not, primarily, about hiring. Rather, they are about
how a much broader set of human resource management choices are related to organizational
performance. As a result, these papers do not generally make careful distinctions between,
say, hiring practice A and hiring practice B. In some sense, the level of detail with regard to
hiring choices is limited to simple questions about whether the ﬁrm thinks hiring is important,
as opposed to gathering information about ﬁrm-level diﬀerences in speciﬁc hiring strategies.
Second, this literature is subject to questions about causality. Firms in these studies are clearly
choosing one set of organizational practices over another, and it remains unclear whether hiring
choices are driving good performance, or whether there is some third factor that explains both.
We think this literature needs a series of carefully constructed hiring-related ﬁeld experi-
ments. Personnel Economics now has a very solid tradition of incentives-related ﬁeld experi-
ments, and we are eager to see this toolkit applied to hiring decisions. The lack of hiring-related
experiments is, we think, evidence of the great importance of hiring in modern ﬁrms. What
manager, after all, would allow an academic economist to experiment with the ﬁrm’s screen-
ing, interviewing or hiring decisions? We hope this concern will not prevent economists from
performing Safelite-style experiments on hiring practices in the future.
574 Conclusion
We can summarize our view of the last few decades of Personnel Economics research as, “In-
centives matter. Getting them right is important for ﬁrms. Measurement limitations and other
challenges to employers’ ability to implement incentive programs are well explained by recent
agency models.” The primary drivers of this success in studying incentives have been theorists’
ability to use advances in information economics to generate realistic and detailed models of
employment relationships and the availability of new ﬁrm-level and matched employer-employee
datasets.
We hope that the authors of the review of Personnel Economics in the next volume of
this Handbook are able to conclude, “Recent research has generated important and practical
insights into the ways ﬁrms and workers generate economic surplus by matching appropriately.
Firms’ strategic decisions about how to source appropriate workers and how to craft attractive
job packages have advanced signiﬁcantly in the last few years. This is primarily driven by the
development of more nuanced models of hiring and the creative use of ﬁrm-level and employer-
employee datasets.” We recognize, however, that that is more easily hoped for than done.
There are signiﬁcant challenges to the matching research we call for. While data limitations
are the most obvious challenge (it is very rare to have a data source with information both on
people that a ﬁrm hires and those that the ﬁrm does not hire, for example), there may well be
others such as the possibility that the heterogeneity of optimal hiring strategies may simply be
much greater than the heterogeneity of optimal incentives. We hope that, on balance, these
potentially higher costs of doing research on matching and hiring do not discourage researchers
from undertaking work in this area and we hope that at least a few others will join us in trying
to advance this research area.
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